


AGEOD BIOGRAPHIES FOR THE 1755 SCENARIO CAMPAIGN



FRENCH REGULARS





MONTCALM, LOUIS-JOSEPH DE, Marquis de MONTCALM, seigneur of Saint-Veran, Candiac, Tournemine, Vestric, Saint-Julien, and Arpaon, Baron de Gabriac, lieutenant-general; b. at Candiac, France, 28 Feb. 1712, son of Louis-Daniel de Montcalm and Marie-Thérèse-Charlotte de Lauris de Castellane; d. at Quebec 14 Sept. 1759.

The Montcalms were an old and distinguished family of the nobility of the robe. In 1628 Louis de Montcalm had married Marthe de Gozon who brought her family's lands to the marriage on condition that her husband and their male children bear the name and arms of Gozon. In the 17th century the family turned to military service and its members won distinction. At the age of nine, on 16 Aug. 1721, Louis-Joseph de Montcalm was commissioned an ensign in the Régiment d'Hainaut. Eight years later he obtained a captaincy, no doubt by purchase, in the same regiment. Not until 1732, however, did he begin his active military career. Prior to that he was educated, in the usual manner of the aristocracy, by a despairing private tutor who came to regard him as altogether too opinionated and stubborn. During the War of the Polish Succession Montcalm served in the Rhineland with armies commanded by the Maréchal de Saxe and the Maréchal Duke of Berwick. In 1736, on 3 October, he married Angélique-Louise Talon de Boulay. Of their progeny, two sons and three daughters survived

childhood. Mme la Marquise de Montcalm was a daughter of Omer Talon, Marquis de Boulay, colonel of the Régiment d'Orléans, and of Marie-Louise Molé. Her parents were both members of old and powerful families of the robe, which may help to account for her husband's subsequent rapid rise in the military hierarchy.

At the outbreak of the War of the Austrian Succession Montcalm obtained the post of aide-de-camp to lieutenant-general the Marquis de La Fare and was wounded while besieged with the army of the Maréchal de Belle-Isle in Prague. During the famous retreat from Bohemia he served with the rearguard. On 6 March 1743 he acquired the colonelcy of the Régiment d'Auxerrois, valued at 40,000 *livres*, and for the remainder of the war campaigned in Italy. In April of the following year he was made a knight of Saint-Louis. According to his own accounts he had served with distinction and was always in the thick of the fighting. This last was certainly true at Piacenza (Italy) in June 1746 when the Austrians won a crushing victory over the Franco-Spanish armies. Montcalm's regiment was destroyed; he was severely wounded and taken prisoner. When he had recovered sufficiently to travel he went to Paris on parole and on 20 March 1747 was appointed to the functional post of brigadier. As soon as an exchange of prisoners released him from his parole he returned to the army of Italy and was again wounded at yet another disastrous defeat, the battle of Assiette (near Fenestrelle in the Italian Alps). In 1748 peace was declared and on 10 Feb. 1749 the Régiment d'Auxerrois was incorporated into that of Flandres. Montcalm thereby lost his investment but a month later he was commissioned *mestre-de-camp* to raise a regiment of cavalry bearing his own name.

Peace-time soldiering, however, proved expensive. On 6 Oct. 1752 he petitioned the Comte d'Argenson, minister of war, for a pension on the grounds of long service (31 years, 11 campaigns, five wounds), the good opinion held of him by his superior officers, and his mediocre private fortune, which he declared he had never stinted while at the head of his regiment. His plea was heard. On 11 July 1753 he was accorded a pension of 2,000 *livres*. During the seven years of peace Montcalm enjoyed the tranquil life of the provincial nobleman, dividing his time between the provincial society of Montpellier and his *château* at Candiac, supervising his children's education, disputing with a neighbour over property in the courts, and making periodic visits of inspection to his regiment.

Meanwhile hostilities between the French and the English had begun in North America. In one engagement, on 8 Sept. 1755, Baron de

Dieskau, commander of the regulars drawn from the French army, had been captured. A replacement had to be found. With war looming in Europe experienced general officers were loath to serve in such a remote theatre. Recourse had to be had to the lower echelons and the choice fell on Montcalm. On 11 March 1756 he was appointed major-general (*maréchal de camp*), receiving the same rank and pay and allowances as Dieskau – 25,000 *livres* salary, 12,000 *livres* to cover his expenses in moving to Canada, 16,224 *livres* living allowance – plus a pension of 6,000 *livres* payable upon his return to France with the reversion of half of it to his wife should she survive him.

Montcalm's commission and instructions explicitly stated that the governor general of New France, Pierre de Rigaud* de Vaudreuil, had command of all the armed forces in the colony and that Montcalm was subordinate to him in everything. Montcalm was responsible only for the discipline, administration, and internal ordering of the army battalions. He was merely the commander in the field, had to obey any orders he received, and was strictly enjoined to keep on good terms with the governor general. These instructions had been carefully drafted and revised several times to avoid conflicts between the two senior officers.

On 14 March 1756 Montcalm took leave of the king and set off for Brest, accompanied by Colonel Bougainville*, a member of his staff of whom he thought highly. At Brest he met the other members of his staff: his second in command, the Chevalier de Lévis*, and Colonel Bourlamaque. The latter he did not regard with much favour; Lévis he thought to be sound but unimaginative. Also in the convoy were two battalions of regulars from the La Sarre and Royal-Roussillon regiments. Five weeks after setting sail on 3 April the ships were safely in the St Lawrence. Weary of shipboard life, Montcalm disembarked at Cap Tourmente and proceeded to Quebec by road, arriving there on 13 May. He remained in the city for a week, garnering all the information he could on, as he put it, “a country and a war where everything is so different from European practice.” He then proceeded to Montreal to report to the governor general who was preparing to launch an assault against Fort Oswego (Fort Chouaguen).



Their meeting was amicable enough, but in his first reports to Argenson, minister of War, Montcalm voiced reservations, declaring that Vaudreuil had little use for anyone but colonials and, although well intentioned, was irresolute. In appearance, background, character, and temperament, these two men were very different. Vaudreuil, Canadian born, was a big man, courteous and affable, lacking self-confidence but not given to intrigue, obsessed by a need to issue a constant stream of directives to junior officers and officials, anxious to impress his superiors in the ministry of Marine, but always motivated by a genuine concern for the people he governed. To him the French regulars served but one function, the protection of New France from Anglo-American assaults. Montcalm, by contrast, was physically small and rather portly, vivacious, extremely vain, determined to have his own way in all things, critical of everything that did not conform to his preconceived ideas and of anyone who failed to agree with him completely, and possessed of a savage tongue that he could not curb.

Anticipating a renewed Anglo-American assault on Lake Ontario, in February 1756 Vaudreuil had sent, under the command of Gaspard-Joseph Chaussegros* de Léry, 360 Canadians and Indians to harass communications between Fort Oswego and Schenectady (N.Y.). They succeeded admirably, taking Fort Bull (on Oneida Lake, N.Y.) by assault, destroying the fort and a vast amount of stores. The garrison received

no quarter. Other Canadian war parties harassed Oswego all spring and early summer, preventing supplies getting through and putting the fear of God into the garrison. By July Vaudreuil believed the time had come for the destruction of the fort itself. He sent Montcalm to Fort Carillon (Ticonderoga, N.Y.) to inspect the new fort there, and deceive the enemy as to his intentions, then he massed 3,000 men at Fort Frontenac (Kingston, Ont.). Montcalm joined them on 29 July. Before leaving Montreal he had expressed grave misgivings about the expedition, but the main problem proved to be nothing more than the building of a road to bring up the siege guns. After a short bombardment, and with the Canadians and Indians commanded by Vaudreuil's brother, François-Pierre de Rigaud* de Vaudreuil, swarming within musket range, the garrison surrendered. Seventeen hundred prisoners were taken, several armed ships, a large number of cannon, munitions and supplies of all sorts, and a war chest containing funds to the value of 18,000 *livres*. Montcalm stated that the cost of the expedition had been 11,862 *livres*. All told a profitable enterprise, but strategically it was worth far more than that. French control of Lake Ontario was now assured, the northwestern flank of New York was open to attack, and the danger of an assault on either Fort Frontenac or Niagara (near Youngstown, N.Y.) dissipated.

Vaudreuil was pleased with what he referred to as "my victory." Montcalm still had reservations. In a dispatch to the minister of War he admitted that the audacity of the assault would have been regarded as foolhardy in Europe. He assured the minister that were he to be given a command in Europe he would conduct himself differently and that, even on this occasion, had things gone wrong he would have retreated, and saved the guns and the honour of the army by sacrificing perhaps two to three hundred men. The nature of the terrain, the timidity of the Anglo-Americans, their fear of the Indians had, he declared, given him victory. Vaudreuil, too, had misgivings, but not over the manner in which victory had been achieved. He was gravely concerned at the attitude of the French regulars towards campaigning in America, and towards the Canadians. Trouble that was to plague the colony for the ensuing four years was just beginning. Montcalm was critical of the strategy and tactics that Vaudreuil was employing. Whereas Vaudreuil believed in spoiling attacks to frustrate enemy offensives, in the form of raids on the English frontier settlements, to cut their communications, destroy their supply depots, and keep them continually off balance, Montcalm was convinced that against British regular troops the only hope lay in a static defence. He had nothing but contempt for guerilla warfare and insisted that the only sane way to fight the war was the way that war

was fought in Europe. He quickly came to nurture considerable antipathy towards Vaudreuil and also towards all things Canadian. He considered that the Canadian regulars had an inflated opinion of themselves and that the militia were an undisciplined rabble of little or no military value. As for the Indians, he regarded them with contempt, declaring that their only merit was to be a good thing not to have against one. Yet at the same time he claimed that he had won the esteem and confidence of the Canadians and that the affection with which he had come to be held by the Indians had astonished Vaudreuil who was not a little jealous of it.

For a general to hold a low opinion of his superior, and give voice to it, was quite normal in the French army of the day. A senior officer had to devote much of his time to countering the intrigue and chicanery of other general officers and their supporters at court who sought his dismissal. In Montcalm's case the minister of War encouraged intrigue by providing him with a special cipher and a private address to enable him to express himself more freely than his normal dispatches through regular channels would allow. Montcalm, however, carried this propensity to excess; before his officers and servants he would make what was, at times, slanderous criticism of Vaudreuil. Needless to say, the governor general was quickly informed.

Early in 1757, while the British were preparing to besiege Louisbourg, Île Royale (Cape Breton Island), Vaudreuil made plans for an attack on the English bases south of Lake Champlain. Were they to be destroyed the feared invasion by that route would be disrupted. In July, after the supply ships had arrived from France, Montcalm mustered 6,200 men, regulars and militia, at Carillon. With them were 1800 Indians. Vaudreuil's orders were to destroy Fort William Henry (also called Fort George) at the southern tip of Lac Saint-Sacrement (Lake George, N.Y.), then to destroy Fort Edward, a few miles south. These orders contained the escape clause that Montcalm was to use his own discretion if a push beyond Fort William Henry would endanger the army, but Vaudreuil made it clear that nothing less than this manifest danger should deter Montcalm from marching on Fort Edward.

By 3 Aug. 1757 Montcalm had his forces massed around Fort William Henry with its garrison of some 2,500 men. The commander, Lieutenant-Colonel George Monro, rejected a call to surrender. Montcalm therefore, in deliberate European siege style, had a road, entrenchments, and gun emplacements built. On 6 August eight cannon opened fire. Three days later the garrison offered to surrender on terms. These were

quickly arranged. The garrison was allowed to retire with the honours of war and their baggage, but could not serve against the French for 18 months; within three months all prisoners held by the British, taken in North America, were to be returned to Canada; all cannon, munitions, and stores in the fort were to be left intact. For their part, the French agreed to escort the garrison to Fort Edward to protect them against the Indians.

The responsibility for what ensued has been much disputed. As the garrison was marching off it was attacked by the Indians; a number were killed and some five or six hundred were dragged off to the Indian encampment. Montcalm and his officers, after the trouble had started, did all they could to stop it and about 400 of the prisoners were recovered. Vaudreuil later ransomed most of the remainder but several were killed and some eaten. Montcalm made light of the incident. He wrote to generals Daniel Webb and John Campbell, Earl of Loudoun, warning them that the unfortunate event did not provide them with an excuse to fail to abide by the terms of the surrender. The British thought otherwise; the garrison of Fort William Henry was released from its parole, and the Canadian prisoners were not returned. But the 44 pieces of artillery, large stocks of ammunition, and enough food to sustain 6,000 men for six weeks were welcome additions to the French stores.

The enemy had been dealt a sharp blow but its effect was to a degree nullified by the breach in the surrender terms and by Montcalm's failure to follow up the victory by destroying Fort Edward. The British were thoroughly demoralized, Fort Edward was only 16 miles away, a day's march, and in New York there was near panic as word was expected any hour that the French had taken, not only Fort Edward, but Albany as well. Montcalm, however, refused to go farther. He claimed that the road to Fort Edward was in too bad a condition to move his heavy guns, that the garrison of the fort had been reinforced by four to five thousand militia, that the consumption of food supplies would be too great, and that he had to send back the Canadian militia to bring in the harvest. Vaudreuil was irate over Montcalm's decision. He regarded the reasons advanced as inadequate, as mere excuses in fact, and François Bigot* reported to the minister that several senior French officers agreed with him.

Montcalm was, however, well pleased with what he had accomplished. In his dispatch to the minister of War he had great praise for his own conduct, declared that he was doing everything he could to

please Vaudreuil, and submitted a plea for promotion to lieutenant-general on the grounds of his length of service, that he was the only major-general in command of an army 1,500 leagues removed from France, and that he had already gained two victories. He may have been encouraged to press his case upon receiving word, in a letter dated 11 March 1757, that he had been appointed a commander of the order of Saint-Louis. He also requested that in the event of Vaudreuil's demise the post of acting governor general should go to him rather than, in the customary succession, to the governor of Montreal, who happened to be Vaudreuil's brother, François-Pierre, and a man recognized to be of meagre talents under whom Montcalm could not be expected to serve. His point was well taken, but Machault, minister of Marine, had already seen to it. The previous year a sealed packet had been sent to Bigot to be opened in the event of Vaudreuil's death, containing letters patent delegating the governor general's authority to Montcalm, and, in the event of his death, to Lévis.

Another serious problem, inflation, was not so easily solved. The influx of French regulars, the Acadian refugees, the horde of allied Indians who had to be fed and supplied during campaigns, resulted in a shortage of goods of all kinds. In addition, money poured into the colony, over a million *livres* a year for the army battalions alone; thus too much money and too few goods caused prices to soar. Montcalm complained continually, and bitterly, that he and his officers could not live on their pay, even though they were paid twice as much as the Canadian regulars. His own situation, he claimed, was particularly bad since he had to keep an open table. He declared in 1757 that he had already overdrawn his pay by 12,000 *livres* and was consuming his children's patrimony to maintain the dignity of his position.

During the winter of 1757–58 complaints over the food supply became more and more vociferous. Rations of the staples, bread and meat, were reduced severely. In Montreal there were protests from both soldiers and civilians. When horse meat was issued instead of beef the authorities had to take stern measures. Montcalm thought they had not been stern enough. The urban dwellers certainly had to tighten their belts but there is no evidence that anyone starved. A main cause of the trouble was crop failures in 1757 and again in 1758. The colony was therefore heavily dependent on supplies from France. But the needed supplies were sent and the bulk of them reached the colony.

This situation offered Montcalm an opportunity to attack Vaudreuil and the entire Canadian administration, which he labelled as totally

corrupt and hopelessly inefficient. Montcalm also began declaring over and over again to his officers, and to the ministers of War and Marine, that defeat was inevitable, that the colony was doomed despite his own efforts and the valour of his troops. The two factors, corruption in the administration and defeat, were linked as cause and effect. Vaudreuil was the main target of Montcalm's hostility, but Bigot, although Montcalm was openly on good terms with him, was also the subject of detailed accusations. These charges had a telling effect, for the minister of Marine was already alarmed by the soaring cost of military operations in America. He became convinced that the main cause was the huge profits that Bigot and his associates were making by devious means. The Canadian administration appeared in a bad light and the minister of Marine now tended to give greater credence to Montcalm than to Vaudreuil, who was not always his own best advocate.

Vaudreuil's position was further weakened by Montcalm's reports of the excessive gambling, the lavish banquets, that were indulged in by Vaudreuil's and Bigot's entourage. Montcalm, although critical of these activities, felt obliged to take part in them. He also entertained some of the Canadian notables and found their society agreeable. He was particularly appreciative of the charm and wit of the Canadian ladies but he appears not to have enjoyed the same success in the boudoir as did Lévis, and he was rather disgruntled about it.

In 1758 Vaudreuil hoped to block a British drive on Lake Champlain with the French regulars at Carillon under Montcalm while Lévis, with 1,600 men, mainly Canadians, led a diversionary attack on Schenectady by way of the Mohawk Valley. When Montcalm received his orders he refused to comply with them and demanded that they be revised. To avoid a public scandal and the disruption of the campaign Vaudreuil complied, but he was outraged when Montcalm made the incident public. After Montcalm had departed for Carillon, in June, word was received that the British army at Lac Saint-Sacrement was much larger than anticipated. Lévis's diversionary force was immediately recalled and ordered to Carillon post-haste.

At the southern end of Lac Saint-Sacrement Major-General James Abercromby* had massed the largest army ever assembled in North America, over 6,000 British regulars and 9,000 provincial troops. On 5 July they started north down the lake. Montcalm meanwhile was trying to decide where, or even if, to make a stand. The fort at Carillon he regarded as unable to withstand an assault, let alone a siege. At one point he contemplated blowing it up and retreating to Fort Saint-Frédéric

(Crown Point, N.Y.) but he was persuaded to hold fast. The killing of Brigadier George Augustus Howe, Abercromby's popular and competent second in command, in a skirmish at the portage between the two lakes on 6 July disheartened the British and delayed their advance 24 hours. This delay alone allowed Montcalm to complete his defence works. On the evening of the 7th Lévis arrived with 400 Canadian regulars and militia, bringing Montcalm's total force to over 3,600.

Next day, 8 July, Abercromby made a hasty inspection of the site and, believing that Montcalm was shortly to receive 3,000 reinforcements, decided to attack at once without waiting to bring up his guns. Had he brought his cannon into play Montcalm's log wall would quickly have been smashed to kindling, and his troops with it. In fact, there was no need even to do this. Had Abercromby surveyed the terrain more closely he could not have failed to see that to the right of and below Montcalm's defence work, which stretched across the crest of the rising ground, half a mile of level, open land extended to the lake and back to the fort. All he had to do was use part of his force to hold Montcalm, then march the remainder round on the north flank and take the French in the rear. The British would then have been between Montcalm's force and the fort. Abercromby would have had the French pinned against their own barricade. All that Montcalm placed on that plain was the 400 Canadians behind another short and hastily constructed log wall at the foot of the slope. They could easily have been outflanked or overwhelmed, and indubitably would have been blamed for the ensuing disaster. Fortunately for the French, Abercromby ignored that glaring flaw in the French position. (After the battle Montcalm extended this defence line to the lake.)

Shortly after noon on 8 July the British regulars formed up in four columns, provincial skirmishers between them, and the attack went in against the French abatis. Their formations were quickly broken up as they scrambled through the tangle of felled trees. Before they reached the French line they were shot to pieces by steady musket fire. They reformed and attacked but were beaten back with heavy loss every time. By seven o'clock they could take no more. The French then vaulted their barricade and drove off the remaining skirmishers. At that the whole British army turned and fled in wild disorder, abandoning their arms, their equipment, and their wounded. For them it was a stunning defeat. For Montcalm and the French a glorious victory. The British had suffered 1,944 casualties, 1,610 of them regulars, the French only 377.



Three days after the battle Montcalm sent a brief account of it to the minister of War, which on certain points was not in accord with the facts. In it he declared that Vaudreuil had deliberately held back the 1,200 Canadians and a large force of Indians that he had promised to send to Carillon. He stated that his small army had been attacked by 20,000 British – he subsequently raised this estimate to 25,000, then 27,000, and eventually to 30,000 – from eight in the morning until eight that night. The British casualties he placed at 5,000. But what he found most gratifying was that he had saved the colony without the French regulars' having to share the glory; there had been only some 400 Canadians and a handful of Indians present at the battle. On 20 July, however, he stated that without necessity, without a specific objective, he had been sent a large body of Canadians and Indians that he had neither wanted nor requested, and who, arriving too late to take part in the action, had merely consumed precious supplies. He declared that he had no doubt they had been sent to reap profit from his victory. He also stated that had he had 200 Indians at the battle the British could have been destroyed in their retreat. Only the lack of these Indians had prevented him from following up his victory. He then went on to accuse the officials of the ministry of Marine of holding back his dispatches, and concluded by requesting his recall, declaring that his health and his finances were ruined; by the end of the year he would have overdrawn his pay by 30,000 *livres*. But most of all, the unpleasantness and

contradictions that he had to endure, the impossibility of doing things properly or of preventing abuses, determined him to ask for his release.

In a subsequent account of the battle written for publication he praised all who had taken part, including the Canadians, but this was accompanied by a private dispatch to the minister of War, sent in cipher on 28 July by André Doreil, the war commissary. In this last Montcalm told a different story. He declared he was in no doubt the ministry of Marine would seek to enhance the glory of the Canadians at the battle and diminish that of the French troops, but in truth the Canadians had performed badly. They had refused to attack the enemy when ordered and had had to be fired on when they tried to abandon their post. Montcalm claimed that he had had to silence the officers and men of the French battalions who swore that Vaudreuil had sought to have them slaughtered by sending such a small force against a large army. Doreil added there could be no doubt that Vaudreuil, jealous of the glory previously gained by Montcalm, had sought to deny him the means to establish a sound defence.

It did not take long for word of Montcalm's accusations to reach Vaudreuil and he was, of course, furious. On 4 Aug. 1758 he responded by criticizing, in a dispatch to the minister of Marine, Montcalm's entire conduct of the campaign and exalting the part played by the Canadians, who had been placed in such a dangerous position on the day of the battle. He was sure that Montcalm would fail to give them their due. He stated that the Indian allies had returned to Montreal and stated publicly that they would never serve with Montcalm again. He also informed the minister that to prevent an open conflict he had chosen to ignore all the personal insults and slurs emanating from, or sanctioned by, Montcalm, but things had now gone too far; he therefore requested the minister to accept Montcalm's request for his recall. He stated that Montcalm possessed many estimable qualities and deserved to be promoted lieutenant-general, for service in Europe, but he most certainly did not have the capacity to command the forces in Canada. The Chevalier de Lévis, he declared, did. Vaudreuil therefore requested that Lévis be appointed to succeed Montcalm.

Between Montcalm and Vaudreuil an angry exchange of letters took place in August and September 1758. Montcalm retorted to Vaudreuil's querying his failure to pursue the defeated foe by stating that it would have served no useful purpose, that Vaudreuil had had no military experience, and that had he visited the region he would have realized pursuit had been impossible. As for the complaints of the

Indians, they had behaved badly and he had scolded them. He denied vehemently that he had ever spoken ill of Vaudreuil, or allowed others to do so in his presence. He declared that he had always been at pains to write nothing unfavourable concerning Vaudreuil or his brother, this despite the fact that he knew he was constantly criticized in Vaudreuil's entourage. (His letters, dispatches, and journal are, however, replete with savage comments on both Vaudreuil and his brother.) He concluded by requesting Vaudreuil to solicit his recall on the grounds of health and his debts. If the minister concluded that the real reason was Montcalm's discontent with Vaudreuil, no matter.




Although Montcalm's victory at Carillon and the long drawn out siege of Louisbourg, Île Royale (Cape Breton Island), had saved Canada from a full scale assault in 1758, there was no doubt in anyone's mind that it would be renewed the next year. The question was, how best to

meet it? Here again Montcalm and Vaudreuil were in violent disagreement. Montcalm was convinced that the colony could not be successfully defended, but the attempt had to be made and the inevitable end delayed as long as possible, for the honour of the army. The British, he stated to the minister of Marine, could put 50,000 men in the field, not counting those employed at Louisbourg, against the 7,400 regulars and militia available in Canada. In fact, the British had 23,000 regulars in America, plus some provincial troops and the militia who were of dubious value. Moreover, Montcalm grossly underestimated both the number and the effectiveness, when properly employed, of the Canadian militia. Thus the odds were nowhere near as disadvantageous as Montcalm claimed. He maintained that only if peace were to be declared before the British launched a triple assault, or he were to receive several thousand additional regular troops with supplies, could defeat be averted, and given the weakness of the French navy he regarded it as impracticable for France to risk sending such a force across the Atlantic.

Although he hoped to be removed from the scene a year thence, Montcalm in early autumn 1758 submitted proposals to Vaudreuil for the colony's defence against the expected onslaught. He called for the abandonment of the Ohio valley and the outer defences on Lakes Ontario and Champlain; the guerilla warfare on the English colony's frontiers had to cease and 3,000 of the Canadian militia be incorporated into the regular troops; the colony's entire forces then had to be concentrated on the inner defences on the St Lawrence and Richelieu rivers. He maintained that the nature of the war had changed, that it had now to be fought on European, not Canadian lines. Vaudreuil rejected Montcalm's recommendations. He refused to abandon the outer defence lines, declaring that the enemy had to be made to fight every foot of the way and worn down before he reached the central colony.

To impress on the French government the urgent need for troop reinforcements and supplies Vaudreuil in August sent a Canadian officer, Major Michel-Jean-Hugues Péan*, to the court. Doreil promptly arranged with the captain of the ship he was to cross on to open the mail pouch and have copies made of Vaudreuil's dispatches. He also wrote to warn the officials in the ministry of War that Péan was a base character who was being sent to France for sinister reasons. To counter whatever it was that Vaudreuil had instructed Péan to do, Montcalm obtained Vaudreuil's consent, at the beginning of November, to send Bougainville and Doreil to the court to make clear his view of the situation.

In his dispatches Vaudreuil, in an attempt to impress on the minister of Marine the urgency of the situation, made it appear bleak. Bougainville went much farther; he described it as utterly hopeless. In two memoirs, and doubtless several interviews, he reiterated Montcalm's expressed opinion that Canada could not be defended against the forces the British were prepared to throw against it. None of the fortified places was defensible, least of all Quebec, therefore it would be futile to send reinforcements to Canada. In any event the Royal Navy would surely intercept them. He failed to mention that supply convoys had eluded the British and reached Quebec every year of the war. Following Montcalm's dictates he recommended that the outer defences of the colony be abandoned, the available forces concentrated in the inner colony, and the inevitable defeat delayed as long as possible. He also asked that instructions be sent on the capitulation terms the French should request, and orders given empowering Montcalm, 24 hours before the capitulation took effect, to muster what remained of the regular troops and embark in a fleet of canoes for Louisiana. This move, it was claimed, would prevent the loss of a sizeable body of men and preserve the honour of French arms by a feat rivalling the retreat of the Ten Thousand that had immortalized the Greeks. A second proposal, even more bizarre, was that Canada could be saved were France to send an expeditionary force to invade North Carolina. The British would be taken by surprise, their forces being concentrated in the north; the southern colonies abounded in supplies; the large slave population could be made use of in one way or another; and if the invading army were unable to maintain itself in the Carolinas it could retire to Louisiana.



Given these wild proposals and the fact that they were postulated on one premise, defeat, the wonder is that the council of ministers took seriously anything recommended by Montcalm and Bougainville. Yet their views carried more weight than did those of Vaudreuil. The government, pinning its hopes on the plan for an invasion of England, decided that neither ships nor men could be spared for Canada, or for a diversionary assault on the Carolinas. Montcalm's request for his recall was given serious consideration, then denied. Instead, on 20 Oct. 1758, he was promoted lieutenant-general, the second highest rank in the French army, and his salary was increased to 48,000 *livres*. Since a lieutenant-general ranked much higher than a colonial governor general, Montcalm was given command of all the military forces in Canada and Vaudreuil was instructed to defer to him in all things, even routine administrative matters. They were both instructed that little in the way of reinforcements could be spared, therefore they were to remain strictly on the defensive and strive to retain a foothold in Canada; then the territory given up to the enemy could be recovered at the peace table. In short, the strategy recommended by Montcalm had to be adopted. The ministers of Marine and of War both expressed confidence that the general, who with only 4,000 men had won such a resounding victory over greatly superior forces at Carillon, would find a way to frustrate

the enemy's coming offensive, and that Montcalm and Vaudreuil would establish a close union to achieve this end.

Early in May 1759 over 20 supply ships reached Quebec. On one of them was Bougainville, accompanied by 331 recruits and a handful of officers. Close behind them was the Royal Navy escorting Major-General James Wolfe at the head of 8,500 troops, the bulk of them well trained British regulars. This fleet was able to sail up to Quebec and put the troops ashore on the Île d'Orléans without hindrance. Montcalm, accompanied by an engineer and a naval officer, Nicolas Sarrebource* de Pontleroy and Gabriel Pellegrin*, had, the year before, surveyed the river from Quebec to Cap Tourmente and had subsequently suggested to Vaudreuil where batteries might be sited. As early as 1753 an engineer officer, Dubois, had made the same survey and declared that a battery on Cap Corbeau, opposite Île aux Coudres, would wreak havoc on any fleet coming up the narrow channel, where it could not manoeuvre or bring its guns to bear; but nothing had been done. For this Vaudreuil has to be held responsible. As late as March 1759, however, Montcalm had declared that there was little cause to fear for Quebec, because the difficulties of river navigation would render it virtually impossible for the British to bring a fleet up the river. The real threat, he believed, would be on the Lake Champlain front. Vaudreuil agreed with him, being sure that the British could not bring ships of the line to Quebec without Canadian pilots. It did not cross his mind that the British would make use of captured pilots. In any event, when word was received that the British fleet was approaching, frantic efforts began, under Montcalm's directions, to fortify the shoreline from the Rivière Saint-Charles to the Montmorency. All told, Montcalm had some 15,000 to 16,000 men under his command, and the advantage of a fortified position that the enemy would have to assail. Moreover, time was on his side. The British had to defeat his army and take Quebec before the end of the summer. Montcalm had only to hold them off for not more than three months, then they would be forced to sail away or be destroyed by the onset of the winter. He did not have to defeat them in a set battle, merely make sure that they did not defeat him. The British, however, did have one advantage – command of the river. This advantage was greatly enhanced by Montcalm's decision to establish his main supply base at Batiscau, some 50 miles above Quebec, while he massed his army at Beauport, on the other side of the city.



Another grave mistake was the failure to fortify Pointe-Lévy across from Quebec. At the behest of Admiral Charles Saunders* the British landed 3,000 men and quickly dug in. The Canadians, fearing that the British would establish batteries to bombard the city, were greatly perturbed but Montcalm and his officers were of the opinion that the range was too great for much damage to be done. Not until 11 July did Montcalm consent to an attack on the British position. By then they were well entrenched [see Robert Monckton*]. Instead of using his regulars Montcalm authorized a night attack by 1,400 volunteers led by Jean-Daniel Dumas* – including a detachment of schoolboys who had never been in action before – and only 100 regulars. Against more than double their number of British regulars in a fortified position the attempt had no hope of success. It was a fiasco and Montcalm voiced his disdain for military operations conducted by amateurs. The next day the bombardment of Quebec began. It was to continue for two months and reduce the city to rubble.

Fortunately for the French, Wolfe was a poor tactician. Instead of making use of the fleet's mobility to attack above Quebec where the French were most vulnerable, he was determined to smash through


Montcalm's lines below the city, then attack across the Rivière Saint-Charles which could be forded at low tide. On 9 July he landed a brigade at Montmorency which Montcalm declined to oppose, fearing to commit his forces lest it prove to be a feint; then Wolfe quickly brought in reinforcements and made the position impregnable. Wolfe also sent diversionary forces up river to make surprise landings and threaten Montcalm's supply line. This move forced Montcalm to establish mobile detachments to follow the ships' movements and counter the raids.

On 31 July Wolfe launched an assault on the Montmorency-Beauport lines. It was beaten back with heavy losses. This result convinced Vaudreuil that Wolfe would not attack there again. He was gravely concerned lest Wolfe should attack above the city and wanted that flank strengthened but Montcalm refused to believe that the danger there was real. He was convinced that Wolfe would continue to hammer at the Beauport lines.

Montcalm did not know it, but Wolfe too had begun to despair and his health had deteriorated seriously. Frustrated at every turn, he gave orders to lay the Canadian settlements waste. He was determined that if he could not take Quebec, he would destroy as much of the colony as possible. All through August into September this destruction persisted until some of the British officers were sickened by it [see George Scott]. As the days slipped by and the nights became cooler the navy became anxious. Admiral Saunders declared that the fleet would have to sail by 20 September at the latest.

Before admitting defeat and departing, Wolfe had to launch a final assault, although he had little confidence of success. He wanted to attack the Beauport lines again but when he proposed this plan to his brigadiers they rejected it. They submitted proposals for an attack above Quebec, to cut Montcalm's supply route and his communications with Montreal. This action, they claimed, would force him to come out of his lines and give battle. Wolfe gave way and made preparations to shift his army up river. Vaudreuil, seeing the British abandon their base at Montmorency and the army transported upstream, became more concerned than ever about that flank and wanted the forces above Quebec strengthened. His urging alone was enough to cause Montcalm to regard such a move as ill advised and to persist in holding his main force below Quebec. He insisted that Bougainville, based at Cap Rouge, with 3,000 élite troops and Canadian volunteers, had an adequate force to repel any attempt to land astride the Montreal road, or at least to hold the enemy until the main force could come up from Beauport.

At the last minute Wolfe made a vital change in the brigadiers' plan. Instead of landing well above Quebec to cut the Montreal road he chose to land within two miles of the city walls, thus placing his army between Quebec and Bougainville's force. By this time the French were congratulating themselves that the campaign was virtually over; that the British would shortly be forced to sail ignominiously away.



Then, in the early hours of 13 September, a series of errors on the part of the French, and incredible luck for the British, allowed Wolfe's men to effect a landing at Anse au Foulon. Within hours, to the great surprise of even Wolfe, the British had some 4,500 men on the Plains of Abraham, less than a mile from the city. At daybreak Montcalm was informed but he refused to believe it. Only a small force was sent to bolster the outposts on the cliff. A few hours later he decided to see for himself. When he reached the heights beyond the city walls and saw the British army drawn up he was staggered and immediately ordered the army to come up at the double. There was, however, no need for Montcalm to oblige Wolfe by giving battle immediately; in fact, no need for him to give battle at all. As the Maréchal de Saxe had observed, more was to be gained by manoeuvre than by giving battle. All that Montcalm had to do was avoid a major engagement for a few days, then Wolfe would have been forced to attempt to withdraw his army

down the steep cliff to the narrow beach to be taken off by ships' boats. Given the forces at Montcalm's disposal, withdrawal could have been made a costly operation. In fact, Wolfe had placed his army in terrible jeopardy.

With the enemy virtually at his mercy, Montcalm chose the one course of action that ensured his defeat. He decided to attack at once with the troops he had at hand, not wait for Bougainville to come up with his force. He failed even to notify Bougainville that the enemy had landed, relying on the outposts to do that. It was, in fact, Vaudreuil who sent word to Bougainville. While the Canadian militia and Indians were galling the British lines from cover, Montcalm mustered his troops in three units, some 4,500 in all, approximately the same number as the British and less than half the force he could have put in the field. Wolfe's regulars were well disciplined and trained. Montcalm's were not. He had recently incorporated a large number of untrained militia into their ranks. Some of the regulars, come from the Beauport lines at the double, hardly had time to catch their breath before Montcalm gave the order to abandon the high ground and advance down the thicket-strewn slope towards the foe. The result was predictable. The French formations quickly became disorganized. At extreme musket range they halted to fire ragged volleys, then many of the men dropped to the ground to reload. The British held their fire until the range closed, replied with rapid platoon fire, advanced through the smoke, then gave crashing volleys by battalion all down the line. Great gaps were torn in the French ranks, the survivors turned and ran, the British in hot pursuit. The French were saved from complete destruction only by the deadly fire of the Canadian militia from the flanks. It was they who forced the British to halt and regroup. The French regulars, in a disordered mass, poured through the city streets, Montcalm, on horseback, bringing up the rear. Just as he was about to enter the Saint-Louis gate he received a mortal wound. Wolfe, wounded earlier, was already dead. For both generals in an 18th-century battle to be killed is indication enough that the tactics employed left something to be desired. After the battle was over Bougainville arrived with his force, then quickly withdrew to Cap Rouge.



At Beauport Vaudreuil sought to reorganize the demoralized army. He sent a courier to Montcalm, who was being given medical aid in the city, requesting his advice on what should be done. The reply was that Vaudreuil had a choice of three courses of action: give battle again, retreat to Jacques Cartier, or capitulate for the entire colony. He left it to Vaudreuil to decide. But, without informing the governor general, he wrote to Brigadier-General George Townshend*, who had succeeded Wolfe, surrendering the city to him. This missive, if received, was without immediate effect. Vaudreuil meanwhile held a council of war attended by Bigot and the principal officers of the French regulars. Both he and Bigot urged that another attack be made, since they could still put twice as many men in the field as the British and still held the city, but the French officers had no stomach for it. They demanded that the army retire to Jacques Cartier, join forces with Bougainville, and regroup. In the face of this opposition Vaudreuil gave way and ordered the retreat to begin that night. At 6:00 p.m. he wrote to Montcalm informing him of the decision and also that he had provided the officer commanding in Quebec, Jean-Baptiste-Nicolas-Roch de Ramezay *, with a copy of the terms of the capitulation that were to be asked of the British. These terms had been drawn up by Montcalm weeks earlier and concurred in by Vaudreuil. The tone of Vaudreuil's letter was calm and gentle. He expressed his deep concern at Montcalm's condition, his hope that he would quickly recover, and urged him to care for himself, to think only of his restoration to health. Montcalm's aide-de-camp, Marcel, sent word back that Montcalm approved of Vaudreuil's decisions, that he

had read the terms of capitulation, and that they had been handed over to Ramezay. In a postscript Marcel added that Montcalm's condition had not improved as of ten o'clock but that his pulse was a little better. Later that night he received the last sacraments, then he instructed his aide-de-camp to write to his family conveying his last farewell. His papers he ordered turned over to Lévis. At five in the morning, as dawn was breaking over the shattered city, his defeated army in full retreat, Montcalm expired. He was buried in a shell crater under the floor of the Ursulines' chapel.

The Chevalier de Lévis came post-haste from Montreal when he received word of the defeat, assumed command, and set about restoring order. He was livid with fury. In his dispatch to the minister of War he declared: "One must admit that we have been very unfortunate; just when we could hope to see the campaign end with glory, everything turned against us. A battle lost, a retreat as precipitous as it was shameful, has reduced us to our present condition, all caused by attacking the enemy too soon without mustering all the forces at his [Montcalm's] disposal. I owe it to his memory to vouch for the honesty of his intentions, . . . he believed he was acting for the best, but unfortunately, the general who is defeated is always wrong." And Bourslemont, at Lake Champlain, cynically remarked that the only satisfaction to be derived from the disaster was to have had no part in it.

Despite the valiant efforts of Lévis and the reorganized forces he now commanded, Vaudreuil, over the protests of Lévis, was obliged to capitulate the following September to General Jeffery Amherst* at Montreal. The French officers, including Lévis, sought desperately to ensure that Montcalm's defeat and its consequences would not rub off on them. This attempt placed them in a dilemma; to blame Montcalm meant that the army had to accept responsibility for the loss of Canada, and they feared that they would have to share in that blame. Nevertheless, several of them admitted that Montcalm's precipitate action on the day of the battle had been fatal.

When Louis XV and his ministers received word of the capitulation they were far more disturbed over the fact that the army had surrendered without being accorded the honours of war than they were over the loss of the colony. They showed no concern whatsoever for the plight of the Canadians. Someone had to be held responsible for the disaster, and it could not be Montcalm. He was not there to defend himself and he had to be exonerated to spare the reputation of the

army. It clearly could not be Lévis, who had protested the terms of the capitulation. The obvious choice was Vaudreuil. For the preceding four years Montcalm and his entourage had predicted the outcome, defeat, and held that the corrupt colonial administration would be to blame – it was now even held accountable for the outcome of the battle of 13 September. Montcalm's predictions, and the body of evidence amassed against Bigot, made Vaudreuil an easy mark. The loss of Canada was therefore blamed, not on Montcalm's poor generalship, not on the superiority of a small army of British regulars over the French battalions in one brief battle that should not have been fought, but on Vaudreuil and the colonial officials. In the letter of condemnation written to Vaudreuil by Berryer, minister of Marine, on orders of the king, Montcalm's name was not mentioned.

Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that when the Marquise de Montcalm requested compensation for her grievous loss, the government was sympathetic. One thing the Marquise specifically requested was that, in consideration of her husband's services and the short time he had enjoyed the perquisites of his lieutenant-general's appointment, the crown would assume the debts he had been obliged to incur while serving in Canada. He had declared that by the end of 1758 they would amount to over 30,000 *livres*, and they must have increased during the ensuing eight months. The minister thereupon wrote to Vaudreuil and Bigot to discover the exact amount that Montcalm had overdrawn his pay and allowances. The reply may well have caused eyebrows to lift. Far from having incurred debts in Canada, as he had so vociferously claimed, Montcalm had amassed a small fortune. In January of each year he had drawn his pay for the ensuing 12 months. The sale of his personal effects, household furnishings, wine cellar, and provisions, had realized enough to reimburse the treasury the amount he had drawn as major-general on 1 Jan. 1759. His estate was thus owed, by the ministry of Marine, his pay as lieutenant-general from 1 Jan. until his death. It amounted to 38,269 *livres* 8 *sols* 10 $\frac{2}{3}$ *deniers*. Also, among his papers had been found 34,717 *livres* in treasury notes (*billets de caisse*) and seven to eight thousand *livres* in letters of exchange dated 1757 and 1758. In addition Bigot had provided him every year with several other letters of exchange to enable him to transfer funds to France. He had thus put aside, over a three year period, after paying all his living expenses, an amount in excess of 80,000 *livres*. How he had contrived to do it is a mystery.

Historians have long been at odds in their assessment of Montcalm. Some have depicted him as does the plaque on the Plains of Abraham:

Montcalm

Quatre fois victorieux

Une fois vaincu

Toujours au grand honneur de la France

Blessé à mort ici le 13 septembre 1759

The gallant, good, and great Montcalm

Four times deservingly victorious

and

at last defeated through no fault of his own

Others can find little good to say of him and hold him mainly responsible for the conquest of Canada. The former assessment requires that virtually everything he wrote be accepted at face value. A critical assessment of the evidence makes plain that to do so would be a mistake – the matter of his debts is sufficient indication of that. He was a brave officer, of this there can be no doubt, but serious defects in his character made him unfit to command an army. His intrigues to undermine the authority of his superior, the governor general, his open and at times slanderous criticism of Vaudreuil and the Canadians, his refusal to admit that tactics other than those employed in Europe had any merit, his chronic defeatism, all caused trouble and undermined the morale of the forces. Yet he had won some notable victories. But in his final campaign, when he was presented with an opportunity to destroy Wolfe's army, or at least avoid his own defeat, he threw it away and suffered one of the most disastrous defeats in history.

It was not, however, Montcalm alone who was responsible for that defeat and the ensuing loss of the French colonial empire in North America. He was merely a product of a military system that was long overdue for the reforms soon to come. As a contemporary military expert, Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte de Guibert, remarked of the French army in the Seven Years' War: "The machine is so worn out that even a

man of genius could only touch it with trepidation. His genius would not suffice to guarantee success.” Montcalm was a product of that system. Indeed, he personified it.

W. J. Eccles

[The manuscript source material touching on the career of Montcalm is quite extensive, but the great bulk of it dates from his appointment as commander of the French battalions in Canada. Prior to that he was only one of some 900 colonels in the French army, and the ministry of War, a rather slipshod organization at this time, obliged to work in temporary quarters in rented houses, dealt only with officers of general rank who, by the end of 1757, numbered 753. Some of Montcalm’s early correspondence with his family is cited in Emmanuel Grellet de La Deyte, *Une sœur de Montcalm, la présidente de Lunas* (Nevers, France, 1900), but his importance as a historical figure dates from his Canadian appointment. Details on his family origins are to be found in Pinard, *Chronologie historique-militaire* . . . (8v., Paris, 1760–78), V, and in La Chesnaye-Desbois et Badier, *Dictionnaire de la noblesse* (2^e éd.), X. Most of the pertinent documents dealing with his later career are to be found in SHA, A¹, and AN, Col., B, C^{11A}, D^{2C}, F³. There is also some important manuscript material in the ASQ, and the valuable collection of Lévis papers, which include Montcalm’s journal and his letters to the Chevalier de Lévis, is in the PAC, MG 18, K7 and K8.


A goodly proportion of this primary source material has been published, including the *Collection des manuscrits du maréchal de Lévis* (Casgrain). The Abbé Casgrain* also edited a selection of documents from the AN, Col., C^{11A}, 100: *Extraits des archives de la Marine et de la Guerre*. Many pertinent documents have been published over the years in the APQ (AQ; ANQ) annual *Rapport*; the *Table des matières des rapports des archives du Québec, tomes 1 à 42 (1920-1964)* (Québec, 1965) should be consulted under the headings Guerre, Journaux, Mémoires, Capitulations, Siège de Québec. A select list of English manuscript and published sources will be found under the biography of James Wolfe.

Most of the secondary sources dealing with the Seven Years’ War in general, and Montcalm in particular, leave much to be desired. Exceptions are the sound, concise, and valuable study by Lee Kennett, *The French armies in the Seven Years’ War: a study in military organization and administration* (Durham, N.C., 1967), and the serious study by André Corvisier, *L’armée française de la fin du XVII^e siècle au*

ministère de Choiseul: le soldat (Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences humaines de Paris, Série Recherches, XIV-XV, 2v., Paris, 1964). On the European background R. P. Waddington, *La guerre de Sept Ans; histoire diplomatique et militaire* (5v., Paris, [1899-1907]), and *Histoire de France, depuis les origines jusqu'à la révolution*, Ernest Lavisse, édit. (9v., Paris, 1903-11), VIII, pt.2: Henri Carré, *Le règne de Louis XV (1715-1774)*, are dated but still useful. W. L. Dorn *Competition for empire, 1740-1763* (New York, 1940), is excellent on the European aspects, poor on events in North America – reflecting the paucity of good monographs at the time of writing.

Of works dealing more specifically with the war in North America, Francis Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe* (Boston, 1884), is vitiated by the author's partisan view of events and his cavalier treatment of evidence. Unfortunately, too many subsequent Anglo-Canadian, British, and American historians have slavishly accepted his interpretations and value judgements. A case in point is Gipson, *The British empire before the American revolution*, IV-VIII. G. M. Wrong, *The fall of Canada: a chapter in the history of the Seven Years' War* (Oxford, 1914) has little value. H. H. Peckham, *The colonial wars, 1689-1762* (Chicago, 1964), is riddled with errors. Frégault, *La guerre de la conquête*, trans. by M. M. Cameron as *Canada: the war of the conquest* (Toronto, 1969), views the conflict with exemplary detachment but is highly critical of Montcalm. Stanley, *New France*, is also detached but the work is based on secondary sources and tends to be superficial. Of the spate of books commissioned by publishers prior to 1959 for the bicentenary of the crucial battle of Quebec, Stacey, *Quebec, 1759* is the best.

The biography of Montcalm by Thomas Chapais, *Le marquis de Montcalm (1712-1759)* (Québec, 1911), is dated, overwritten, and biased, striving to extol, or justify, Montcalm in all things. Conversely H.-R. Casgrain, *Guerre du Canada, 1756-1760; Montcalm et Lévis* (2v., Québec, 1891; Tours, France, 1899) is hostile to Montcalm and seeks to extol Vaudreuil and Lévis. Neither work has much merit. w.j.e.]





LÉVIS, FRANÇOIS (François-Gaston) DE, Duc de LÉVIS, army officer; b. 20 Aug. 1719 at the Château d'Ajac, near Limoux, France, son of Jean de Lévis, Baron d'Ajac, and Jeanne-Marie de Maguelonne; d. 26 Nov. 1787 at Arras, France.

François de Lévis was born into an impoverished branch of one of the more ancient noble families of France. He entered the army in his teens, merely another poor Gascon cadet, but one with excellent family connections; his cousin was the Duc de Lévis-Mirepoix, who became a marshal of France in 1751. On 25 March 1735 he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Régiment de la Marine, and was promoted lieutenant on 3 June. He served in the campaign on the Rhine during the War of the Polish Succession and on 1 June 1737, aged 17, was raised to captain. In 1741 he served in the French "auxiliary" force in the Bavarian army which invaded Bohemia during the War of the Austrian Succession, and took part in the capture and defence of Prague and in the disastrous retreat of 1742. On 19 Feb. 1743 he crossed the Rhine into France with 73 men, exchanged prisoners from four shattered regiments. He fought at Dettingen (Federal Republic of Germany) later that year, then served with his regiment in upper Alsace under the Maréchal de Coigny, and distinguished himself in several battles and sieges in southwestern Germany. Two years later he served with the army of the lower Rhine under the Prince de Conti. In 1746 his regiment joined the army of Italy, in which he served as assistant chief

of staff in the force commanded by his cousin. In August 1747, while his regiment was aiding in the defence of Provence, he relinquished his company in exchange for a supernumerary colonel's brevet and continued to serve until the end of the war as assistant chief of staff.

Lévis had established a reputation as a brave and competent officer noted for his sang-froid, but he lacked the money required to support a regiment of his own. When, therefore, it was decided in 1756 to send reinforcements and a new general staff under the Marquis de Montcalm* to the army in Canada, Lévis accepted the post of second in command of the French regulars with the rank of brigadier. The position carried with it a salary of 18,000 *livres*, a supplement of 18,000 *livres* per year, and a kit and departure allowance of 9,000 *livres*. He also received secret sealed orders to be opened in the event of Montcalm's death or incapacitation which named him to the command of the French regulars. In the event of Governor Vaudreuil [Rigaud]'s demise, Montcalm would automatically succeed him, and were Montcalm subsequently to die or be incapacitated, Lévis was then empowered to assume the office. Accompanied by five servants, he sailed from Brest, France, on 6 April and arrived at Quebec on 31 May.

After seeing to the disembarkation of the troops, Lévis proceeded to Montreal where Vaudreuil and Montcalm were making preparations for the Oswego (N.Y.) campaign. Vaudreuil received him courteously, then dispatched him to take command at the Lac Saint-Sacrement (Lake George) frontier. While Montcalm hesitantly proceeded to lay siege to Oswego, Lévis made his dispositions to repel an attack on Fort Carillon (Ticonderoga, N.Y.). He decided that the best place to engage an approaching force would be at the northern end of Lac Saint-Sacrement, where the enemy would have to disembark and then be most vulnerable. The Anglo-American forces under Lord Loudoun gathered around Fort Edward (also known as Fort Lydius; now Fort Edward, N.Y.) declined to oblige him, however, and he spent the summer in sending out Indian and Canadian war parties to ravage the American frontier settlements in order to tie down their forces and to take prisoners who might provide intelligence of the enemy's dispositions and intentions.



Upon learning of the success of the Oswego expedition, Lévis was very concerned for fear his own efforts would be overlooked. He wrote to the Comte d'Argenson, minister of War, declaring that it would be most disagreeable were Montcalm to receive recognition and favours, and he to be forgotten. He added, however, that were Montcalm to receive nothing then he desired nothing for himself. In the event, Lévis was rewarded with a 1,000-*livre* pension drawn on the order of Saint-Louis.

Lévis was eager to advance his own career; hence he had to make sure that no opportunity was missed to bring himself to the favourable attention of those in power. At the same time he did not begrudge his colleagues any credit that they earned. After François-Pierre de Rigaud de Vaudreuil's 1757 winter raid on Fort William Henry (also called Fort George; now Lake George, N.Y.), he informed the minister that had Vaudreuil offered him the command he would gladly have accepted, "but," he went on, "I could not have done better than he did. That enterprise had all the success that could have been expected of it." This generous comment contrasts markedly with Montcalm's sneering attempt to belittle the results of the raid and to denigrate Rigaud.

By this time relations between Vaudreuil and Montcalm were more than strained. When the minister of War cautioned Lévis to maintain good relations with the governor general, he replied that he got on very well with Vaudreuil and would have a closer relationship with him but for the fact that Montcalm would take umbrage. Lévis declared that he detested intrigue, had avoided it all his life, and would continue to do so. There is abundant evidence that he meant what he said.

In the summer of 1757 Lévis organized the artillery siege train and the transport boats for the assault on Fort William Henry, then took

command of the advance guard. When Montcalm arrived at the head of Lac Saint-Sacrement with the siege guns Lévis and his 3,000 men had the fort invested. After a nine-day siege, the garrison surrendered. Relations between Vaudreuil and Montcalm neared the breaking point after Vaudreuil severely criticized Montcalm for refusing to follow up the victory by capturing Fort Edward as he had ordered. For Lévis, however, Vaudreuil had nothing but praise. In a dispatch to the minister he pleaded that Lévis be promoted major-general, expressing the fear that were his career not advanced he would request his recall to France, which, Vaudreuil asserted, would prove a grave loss to the colony.

The following year marked the turning point in the war. The Anglo-American army received heavy reinforcements of regulars from Britain, and assaults were planned on Louisbourg, Île Royale (Cape Breton Island) to be followed by an attack on Quebec, on the French forts on lakes Champlain and Ontario, and on Fort Duquesne (Pittsburgh, Pa) on the Ohio River. In an attempt to disrupt this strategy Vaudreuil gave Lévis command of 3,000 men – 400 of the fittest of the French regulars, 400 colonial regulars, the rest Canadian militia and Indian allies. He was ordered to march into the Mohawk canton and try to force them to join him in an attack on the British settlements on the Mohawk and Hudson rivers. To have forced the Mohawks, the most pro-British of the Iroquois nations, to enter the war on the French side would have been a devastating blow to the Anglo-Americans. A further objective was to prevent Oswego and its supply line forts being rebuilt and manned. In addition, a thrust towards Schenectady and Albany (N.Y.) would have disrupted the enemy's plans for an assault on the French position on Lake Champlain and allowed Montcalm to manoeuvre the main French force against the Anglo-Americans on Lac Saint-Sacrement.



The strategy was bold but sound, provided the enemy cooperated by awaiting events. This they declined to do. Lévis's force had not gone far when it was hastily recalled; word had been received that the British and Americans were preparing to attack Carillon with an army rumoured to be 25,000 strong. Lévis with 400 of his élite troops headed for Carillon with all speed. They arrived late on 7 July to find the 3,000-odd French troops labouring to finish a log entrenchment and abatis on the crest of the slope before the fort. When the British under James Abercromby launched their assault the next day Lévis was in command of the exposed right flank. Fortunately for the French the British made no attempt to turn it. The battle raged until sunset. The British columns suffered shattering casualties but kept reforming and attacking again and again. Lévis displayed his habitual sang-froid. When Bougainville*, who commanded on the left, was momentarily stunned by a spent musket ball, an officer called to Lévis that Bougainville had just been killed. Lévis, who had a low opinion of Bougainville, is said to have replied, "Ah well, he will be buried tomorrow along with a great many more."

Immediately after the French victory the smouldering resentment Montcalm felt towards Vaudreuil erupted into open conflict. Vaudreuil wrote to the minister of Marine pleading that Montcalm's request for his recall be granted and that Lévis be named commander of the French regulars in his place. Unfortunately for all concerned this request was turned down, but Lévis was promoted major-general. At the end of October he retired to his winter quarters at Montreal, well out of the parlour intrigue and savage squabbling that occupied the time of the senior officers and officials at Quebec.

In mid May 1759, when a renewed British assault was expected, Lévis still expressed confidence in the outcome, provided that they waged a war of manoeuvre and did not lock themselves up in the fortified places. Montcalm privately expressed some resentment that Lévis's views on how the defence should be conducted prevailed over his own with Vaudreuil and the regimental officers. It was, however, fortunate on occasion that Lévis's plans were adopted. When Wolfe*'s army arrived before Quebec in June it was at Lévis's insistence that the Beauport shore from the Saint-Charles to the Montmorency rivers was fortified and the line extended up the latter river when it was discovered that the Montmorency could be forded above the falls and the French position taken in the rear. Lévis was given command of this left flank and when, on 31 July, Wolfe launched a major assault at Montmorency it was beaten back with heavy losses.

Following on the loss of Fort Niagara (near Youngstown, N.Y.) at the end of July [see Pierre Pouchot*], when it appeared likely that the British would make a thrust at Montreal from Lake Ontario, Montcalm felt compelled to detach Lévis with 800 men to counter the threat. Lévis left Quebec on 9 August; thus he was not present at the disastrous defeat of 13 September on the Plains of Abraham. Vaudreuil later declared that had Lévis been there the outcome would have been very different, since he surely would have restrained Montcalm from launching his precipitate attack in column on the British lines.

As soon as Lévis received word of what had transpired he opened his secret sealed orders and instantly departed for Quebec, joining the demoralized French army at Jacques-Cartier on 17 September. He was livid when he learned what had happened, declaring that he had never seen anything to equal the disorder he found among the troops. He declared bluntly that the defeat and shameful rout, just when they believed they would end the campaign with glory, had resulted from Montcalm's decision to attack before he had assembled his entire force. That said, he added that Montcalm had done what he thought was for the best. To Bourlamaque* he wrote that they must try to show things in as good a light as possible. When Vaudreuil asked that he and Lévis should go through Montcalm's papers since they would contain much that concerned the colony, Lévis bluntly refused, stating that he alone was empowered to look at them since they concerned only the French regulars, and he was responsible for them to the minister of War and Montcalm's family. He then set to work to restore order in the ranks, reinforce Quebec before it had to capitulate, and prepared to launch an attack on the British camp. It was, however, too late; on the 18th Jean-Baptiste-Nicolas-Roch de Ramezay surrendered the city. All that could be done was to maintain a defensive position at Jacques-Cartier and send the rest of the army into winter quarters. Once the British fleet had departed in October the remaining French ships slipped down the river bearing pleas for strong reinforcements and supplies to be dispatched at the opening of navigation in order to arrive before the British. Were this not done, or peace not made by spring, Lévis warned, it would be unlikely the colony could be saved.

Those ships also carried dispatches from Lévis to the minister of War relating what had happened. He was particularly concerned lest responsibility for the disaster should rub off on him and damage his career. He informed the minister that in no way could he be held accountable for the mistakes committed during the past campaign and therefore requested that he be given assurance of promotion to

lieutenant-general should he be able to impress on the British that the final conquest of Canada would not be as easy as they now appeared to think. This promotion, however, was not accorded him.

During the winter Lévis and Vaudreuil made their plans for a desperate attempt to beat back the assaults that were sure to come with the spring. Fortunately, their relations remained excellent. They were in accord that the only hope was to retake Quebec as early as possible, then shift the entire force to the Lake Champlain or the upper St Lawrence defensive positions, whichever was threatened first. It was hoped to use the speed afforded by river communication routes to defeat the invading armies one at a time. Everything depended on the initial success at Quebec and the receipt of reinforcements from France.

Orders were issued by Lévis in late November to the battalion commanders. Discipline had to be tightened and uniforms and equipment distributed fairly. The only shortages were in camp kettles, hooded winter coats, and underwear; beef was in short supply but there was enough bread. Vaudreuil ordered the militia captains to see to it that the habitants with soldiers billeted on them had eight days' rations always available so that a detachment could be called out, or the entire army, ready to march on the instant. The militia likewise had to be ready to march on first receipt of the order. Lévis also instructed the regular officers that they were to cooperate with the militia captains, establish good relations with them and treat the habitants gently, there having been too many complaints in the past on that score. To make this last point more firmly, he repeated the order five days later, on 29 March.



Lévis also carried on a polite correspondence with James Murray concerning the French casualties left behind in the Quebec hospital and an exchange of prisoners. Although they could not reach agreement on these issues, they clearly held each other in high regard as professional soldiers. When Lévis sent Murray a small supply of scurvy antidote, the latter reciprocated with a Cheshire cheese. They also exchanged newspapers brought by released prisoners sent from New York on cartel and Lévis commented on the disturbing fact that there was no mention of their particular theatre, that they appeared to have been forgotten in Europe, and then added tartly that he hoped to bring Murray more interesting news in the near future.

Throughout the winter Canadian detachments kept Murray's garrison closely invested, denied them any provisions from the countryside, and launched savage attacks on their outposts. But the worst enemies for the British were the bitter cold and scurvy. By spring Murray's garrison of 7,500 men had shrunk to some 4,000 fit for action.

On 20 April, before the river was free of ice, Lévis set out from Montreal with his 7,000-man army, 3,000 of them militia. Eight days later, after a terrible march through slush and mud, they stood before Quebec. Murray had received warning of their approach and was able to withdraw his advance forces, numbering 1,500 men, from Sainte-Foy and Lorette before Lévis could cut them off. Instead of shutting himself up in Quebec Murray decided to give battle, hoping to defeat the French forces piecemeal. He marshalled his army, 3,900 strong with 20 cannon, on the heights of the Plains of Abraham, the same ground that Montcalm had held in September. Lévis avoided Montcalm's mistake of attacking in column. He mustered his battalions, by now reduced to 5,000 men, in line more swiftly than Murray expected. Owing to a misinterpreted order the La Reine brigade and a body of militia, over 1,400 men, moved to the wrong flank and were left out of the action. The actual opposing forces engaged were therefore about equal in number.

Murray's plan was to hold the heights and pound the advancing French with his cannon. When Lévis's army moved up to attack, the units on the right got some distance ahead of the main body. Murray attempted to seize the opportunity and abandoned the heights, advancing down to marshy ground to attack. Lévis withdrew his right into the shelter of the nearby woods and also ordered the retreat of his

left, which had meanwhile become embroiled in a fight for some houses. Jean d'Alquier* de Servian countermanded the latter order and led his men in a bayonet attack which stopped the British short. At the same time Lévis led an advance on the right that turned the British left flank, threatening to cut it off. The units there swiftly drew back, followed by the centre and then the right. Retreat became a rout. Had the La Reine brigade been in position Murray's army would have been crushed against Quebec's walls and destroyed. As it was, the survivors gained the safety of the town and Lévis was obliged to lay siege, with a totally inadequate siege train. He had won a resounding victory. His casualties were considerably less than Murray's, but the British still held Quebec. Everything now depended on which ships arrived first.

On 9 May the British frigate *Lowestoft* [see Robert Swanton*] sailed into the basin. The fleet under Lord Colvill* was close behind. Nothing remained for Lévis but to raise the siege and retire to Montreal for a last stand. Three British armies now converged on the town, Murray from Quebec, Jeffery Amherst down the St Lawrence from Lake Ontario, and Brigadier-General William Haviland down the Richelieu. Murray ordered all the farms from Jacques-Cartier to Cap-Rouge burned, the people driven south to be a burden on the foe. All the way up the river the habitants were ordered to lay down their arms and return to their homes. Deserted farms were put to the torch. The militia now began to desert en masse, heading to their homes to save them from destruction by laying down their arms. The French regulars also, even the élite grenadiers, deserted in batches. The French army was rapidly melting away; its officers were in despair.

Further resistance was clearly hopeless, and Lévis admitted as much, but he insisted on fighting on to preserve the honour of French arms. In May 1759 he had declared that the army would defend the colony tenaciously and that it would be more honourable to perish, arms in hand, than to submit to a capitulation as shameful as that of Louisbourg. He may well have been strengthened in this resolve by the minister of War's directive dated 19 Feb. 1759 to Montcalm, ordering him to hold out to the last extremity rather than accept terms as shameful as those accepted at Louisbourg, and thereby erase that memory.

On 6 September Amherst's army was at Lachine. Vaudreuil called a council of war and it was agreed that nothing remained but to draw up terms for the surrender of the colony. Amherst concurred with most of them, but demanded that the regular troops not serve again during

the war. What was worse in the eyes of the French officers was that he churlishly refused to grant them the customary honours of war. Lévis thereupon demanded that negotiations be broken off and a last stand made to preserve the honour of the army. It would, he declared, be unthinkable to submit to such humiliating terms before the enemy had been obliged to launch an assault on the town. When Vaudreuil refused to agree to the destruction of Montreal merely for the sake of punctilio, Lévis requested permission to withdraw the French regiments in defiance to Île Sainte-Hélène, where they could only have succumbed to starvation. Again Vaudreuil refused. He commanded Lévis to conform to the terms of the capitulation and order his troops to lay down their arms. All that was left to Lévis was to have the regimental colours burned to deny them to the foe, and to refuse to meet with Amherst and extend him the courtesies customary between generals.

Lévis sailed from Quebec on 18 October, leaving his junior officers to fend for themselves, and arrived at La Rochelle, France, after a rough crossing on 27 November. That same day he wrote to the minister of War informing him, among other things, that Vaudreuil had, to the end, done everything that prudence and human experience were capable of. Under the circumstances, that was generous of him. Five days later he was on his way to Paris. There he petitioned for promotion to lieutenant-general, for a supplement to his Canadian pay and allowances to bring his emoluments up to the 48,000 *livres* that Montcalm had enjoyed, and for release from the term of the capitulation that barred his serving further in the war. He was accorded all three. On 6 Feb. 1761 the treasurer general was instructed to pay Lévis 23,598 *livres*; on the 18th he was granted the rank of lieutenant-general and on 24 March William Pitt wrote from Whitehall to inform Lévis that His Britannic Majesty had been pleased to free him to serve anywhere in Europe. Two weeks later the Duc de Choiseul, minister of War, informed him that he was to serve with the army of the lower Rhine under the Prince de Soubise. Lévis did not, however, exhibit great impatience to return to the field; it was early December before he reported to the marshal. On Christmas eve he received permission to return to Paris and left Düsseldorf (Federal Republic of Germany) in the morning. This swift departure may have been occasioned by his forthcoming marriage, in March, to Gabrielle-Augustine, daughter of Gabriel Michel de Danton, the treasurer general of the artillery and a director of the Compagnie des Indes. He subsequently commanded the advance guard of the Prince de Condé at the battle of Nauheim/Johannisberg (Hesse, Federal Republic of Germany) and distinguished himself by capturing the enemy's guns.

When the war ended in 1763 Lévis left active service and in 1765 was appointed governor of Artois. In 1771 he received the highly honorific commission of commander of one of the four companies of the newly formed guards of the Dauphin's next eldest brother's military household (Gardes du Corps de Monsieur). He subsequently appears to have divided his time between Paris, Versailles, and Arras, seat of the Estates of Artois. He was quite assiduous in his duties and concerned himself with the improvement of communications in his province, in particular the construction of a canal from Béthune to the river Lys, and of a road from Boulogne-sur-Mer to Saint-Omer. During the War of American Independence he corresponded amicably with his old adversary James Murray, now governor of Minorca. They clearly still held each other in high regard. When officers of the Minorca garrison had to return to England during these years Murray wrote to Lévis asking him to use his good offices to procure passports allowing them to return overland through France rather than by sea or the long way round through Italy, Austria, Germany, and the Low Countries. Lévis was always pleased to oblige, even after Murray's nephew Captain Richard Johnston abused Lévis's kindness by drawing on his purse to the amount of 4,800 *livres* with a letter of exchange that both the London bank it was drawn on and Captain Johnston's father refused to honour. Murray hastened to make it good. Lévis declared that nothing gave him greater pleasure than to be of service to Murray. He went on to say that he hoped the war would soon end and that Murray would then return to England by way of Paris so that they could renew their old friendship.

During these years Lévis's career continued to advance. He received the baton of a marshal of France on 13 June 1783, and the following year he was created a duke. Four years later, in his 67th year, although in poor health, he insisted on travelling to Arras to preside at the opening of the provincial Estates. It proved too much for him. He died shortly after his arrival. A monument in his memory was erected by the Estates in the cathedral of Arras. He left a son, Pierre-Marc-Gaston de Lévis, who inherited the title of duke and command of the company of the Gardes du Corps de Monsieur, then went on to a notable career as a member of the Constituent Assembly, and as an émigré, economist, Anglophile, author, and member of the Academy. His widow and two of his three daughters were less fortunate; they went to the guillotine in 1794.

The life of François de Lévis was a remarkable old régime success story. Starting out as an impoverished Gascon cadet he ended his career as a marshal and a duke; beyond that no one could go.

During his early career he had the powerful support in the army and at court of his kinsman the Maréchal de Mirepoix, whom Lévis regarded as his foster father. He lived in an age when patronage was all important, ability counted for little, and intrigue was endemic. He carefully avoided making enemies, but refused to play the sycophant. He remained aloof from factionalism, particularly in his relations with Montcalm and Vaudreuil, and earned the respect of both, which in itself was no small achievement. His competence as a military commander is beyond question; his victories at Montmorency and Sainte-Foy are proof of that. Finally, the esteem in which he was clearly held by his old antagonist Murray speaks volumes.

W. J. Eccles

[The bulk of the manuscript material dealing with Lévis's service in Canada is contained in the *Coll. des manuscrits de Lévis* (Casgrain), in AN, Col., C^{11A}, and in AMA, SHA, A¹ and Y^{1d}. There is reference to his service in Europe in the last two series. Transcripts of his post-war correspondence with Murray are in PAC, MG 23, GII, 1, ser. 1, 5.

There are no complete biographies of Lévis except Gustave de Hauteclouque, *Le maréchal de Lévis, gouverneur général de l'Artois (1765-1787)* (Arras, France, 1901); however, brief entries have been devoted to him in several reference works, such as *Almanach royal* (Paris), 1700-92, L.-C. Waroquier de Méricourt de La Mothe de Comblès, *Tableau historique de la noblesse militaire . . .* (Paris, 1784), and Le Jeune, *Dictionnaire*, and in the memoirs of his son, [P.-M.-G. de Lévis, duc] de Lévis, *Souvenirs et portraits, 1780-1789* (Paris et Londres, 1813). For the Canadian campaigns in which Lévis took part see: Frégault, *La guerre de la Conquête*, Stacey, *Quebec, 1759*, and Stanley, *New France*. A more detailed bibliography for the military history of the period may be found in *DCB*, III, xxii-xxiii. w.j.e.]





BOUGAINVILLE, LOUIS-ANTOINE DE, Comte de BOUGAINVILLE, army officer; b. 12 Nov. 1729 in Paris, France, son of Pierre-Yves de Bougainville, member of the king's council and notary at the Châtelet, and Marie-Françoise d'Arboulain; m. 27 Jan. 1781 Marie-Joséphine de Longchamps-Montendre in Brest, France, and they had four children; d. 20 Aug. 1811 in Paris and was buried in the Pantheon with full military honours on 3 September.

Like all young men of good family in his time, Louis-Antoine de Bougainville received a sound classical education; he showed a particular aptitude for mathematics, which he first studied under Alexis Clairaut and Jean Le Rond d'Alembert. In 1754 and 1756 he published a *Traité de calcul intégral* in two volumes which won for him the

patronage of the Comte d'Argenson, minister of War and member of the Académie des Sciences.

In 1750 Bougainville enlisted in the Mousquetaires Noirs; he was then 21 and rather old to enter the military profession. Three years later he became adjutant in the Régiment de Picardie. He was recommended to General François de Chevert and served as his aide-de-camp in 1754 before going to England in October as secretary to the Maréchal de Lévis-Mirepoix, who had been named ambassador extraordinary to the court in London following incidents in the Ohio valley [see Ange Duquesne* de Menneville]. After returning to France in February 1755 Bougainville was promoted lieutenant in the Régiment d'Apchon and resumed his service with Chevert. On 12 Jan. 1756 he was elected to the Royal Society of London. He received a commission as captain on 27 February, and when Louis-Joseph de Montcalm* was promoted to command the French regulars in Canada, Bougainville was attached to his service as aide-de-camp. They sailed from Brest aboard the *Licorne* on 3 April.

The French and the British were again at war in North America, and Bougainville, who had no combat experience, took an active part in the military campaign. In July and August 1756 he participated in the attack on Oswego (Chouaguen, N.Y.) and its capture, which secured control of Lake Ontario for the French. His conduct earned warm praise from Montcalm, who recommended him to the minister: "You would not believe the resources I find in him. He is capable of giving a good description of what he sees. He exposes himself readily to gunfire, a matter on which he needs to be restrained rather than encouraged. I shall be much mistaken if he does not have a good head for soldiering when experience has taught him to foresee the potential for difficulties. In the mean time there is hardly a young man who, having received only the theory, knows as much about it as he." Montcalm hoped to see his aide-de-camp enter the Académie des Sciences.

In September 1756 Bougainville scouted the British positions in the key Lake Champlain sector, which Governor Vaudreuil [Rigaud]* was considering attacking to neutralize the threat from this direction. In August 1757 he took part in operations in the region and was chosen by Montcalm to carry to Vaudreuil the news of the surrender of Fort George (also called Fort William Henry; now Lake George, N.Y.), a clear victory that Montcalm did not know how to exploit fully.

Naturally Bougainville was involved in the incessant quarrels between Vaudreuil and Montcalm. It seems, however, that unlike Montcalm he quickly understood the kind of warfare to wage in Canada: adopt the Indians' methods, expose oneself as little as possible, avoid pitched battles, and harass the enemy unceasingly by ambushes. On the other hand he seems to have shared Montcalm's prejudices against the Canadians. He told Berryer, the minister of Marine, in a memoir that "the troops of the regular army and of the colonial regulars are in an admirable frame of mind. They will shed their blood for every step that has to be conceded to the enemy," he said, but the militia and the Indians "[are] vain in victory, are incapable of any other sort of warfare, little suited for the defensive, are easily and profoundly discouraged in adversity, [and] have no courage or constancy."

Bougainville's participation in the Lake Champlain operations did not keep him from preparing plans for an attack against the British establishments on Hudson Bay which was to be conducted with four ships of the line, a frigate, and troops from New France. In contrast to the objectives that Jean-François de Galaup*, Comte de Lapérouse, would achieve in 1782, Bougainville's plan called for permanent occupation, not a destructive raid. To ensure the success of the undertaking he wanted to obtain the assistance of Gabriel Pellegrin*, deputy port captain, who was a great expert on Canadian waters; however, circumstances prevented the plan from being carried out.

In July 1758 Bougainville, fighting at Montcalm's side, was wounded in the battle of Carillon (near Ticonderoga, N.Y.), which ended in "overwhelming defeat" for the British. None the less, the French victories scarcely touched the enemy's military strength; the gravest menaces still loomed over the colony, and Vaudreuil and Montcalm continued to differ on the measures to be taken to meet them.



In September 1758 Vaudreuil and Montcalm decided that they would send an officer to France to announce Montcalm's victory, report on the lamentable state of the colony, and ask for aid. Their choice fixed on Bougainville. But knowing that he was wholly devoted to Montcalm, Vaudreuil also sent Major Michel-Jean-Hugues Péan*. Bougainville sailed from Quebec aboard the *Victoire* on 15 Nov. 1758 and landed at Morlaix, France, early in 1759. It was probably during the crossing that he wrote the four reports he gave to Berryer in which Montcalm's pessimistic views, sometimes made even gloomier, are conveyed. One of them set out the colony's needs in men and material. It mentioned the absence of guns and munitions, stating that in Canada there were only two engineers, eight artillery officers, eighty-six gunners or bombardiers, and no sappers or artillery or engineering workers. Appreciably overestimating enemy forces, Bougainville noted that "10,000 men lacking ammunition and supplies, have to defend three virtually

unprotected frontiers against at least 60,000 [who are] in a position to attack all three simultaneously because of their heavy numerical superiority and abundant means of every sort. . . . It seems to me therefore that the court should treat Canada today like a sick person whom one sustains with stimulants, that is, should send only what is absolutely necessary for a prolonged defence.” Among the absolute essentials Bougainville included four ships that could make the defence of Quebec easier. He also advocated that batteries be built at Gaspé, Pointe aux Bouleaux on the north shore of the St Lawrence, Île aux Coudres, Cap Tourmente, Île d’Orléans, and Pointe-Lévy (Lauzon and Lévis); as well, he seemed to have a high regard for the “mobile redoubts,” boats armed with a cannon, which were the brain-child of Louis-Thomas Jacau* de Fiedmont. He also took advantage of his audience with Berryer to denounce Bigot*’s administration.

Having been promoted colonel and knight of Saint-Louis, Bougainville on 28 March 1759 sailed from Bordeaux on the *Chézine* and landed at Quebec on 10 May. He had not, in the end, obtained much for the colony. His arrival, heralding the advent of reinforcements, “put fresh heart into an entire people who during one of the harshest winters had been reduced to a quarter-pound of bread and a half-pound of horse meat” a day, and occasioned general rejoicing, which turned out to be short-lived. Although more than 20 supply ships had reached Quebec at the same time as the *Chézine*, France had not considered it expedient to send more than 300 men to prop up the imperilled colony, or to defend it further, following Bougainville’s advice in this regard.

Soon after his return Bougainville left with Anne-Joseph-Hippolyte Maurès* de Malartic to reconnoitre defensive positions around the town, and in June 1759 he took command of the camp at nearby Beauport. On 27 June the British landed on Île d’Orléans, on 29 and 30 June at Pointe-Lévy, and then on 9 July at Montmorency. After the fighting on 31 July when the British unsuccessfully attacked the camp at Montmorency, Bougainville, with the 500 men under his command, was given the mission of guarding the communications between Quebec and Montreal and ensuring that the supply routes to Quebec were not cut off. Thus he followed the movements of the British fleet up to Pointe-aux-Trembles (Neuville); here on 8 August he twice repelled attempted landings. On 17 August he drove back a force disembarking at Deschambault, and later he prevented the British from landing at Saint-Augustin. But on 13 September the British succeeded in getting a foothold at Anse au Foulon, which was ill defended by Louis Du Pont*

Duchambon de Vergor. Surprised to see the enemy troops so close to Quebec, Montcalm then committed serious errors, among which were failing to give Bougainville orders to trap James Wolfe* between two fires and neglecting the basic principle of concentration of force. Because of poor communications Bougainville, whose troops, brought up to 1,200 men, were widely strung out along the St Lawrence, found it impossible to assemble his men and take part in the battle of the Plains of Abraham. After the surrender on 18 September he went to take up a position in the direction of Saint-Augustin and came back to Quebec to negotiate an exchange of prisoners and settle the fate of the sick and wounded who had been left behind in the hospital.

During the winter of 1759–60 he directed operations to harass the British garrison of Quebec until Vaudreuil sent him at the beginning of March 1760 to command the Île aux Noix sector on the Richelieu; here the situation quickly took a tragic turn because of desertions and the defection of the Indians, who went over *en masse* to the British. On 22 Aug. 1760 an attack by William Haviland* was repulsed, but on 27 August Bougainville had to evacuate the area, with the troops retreating through a wooded area, leaving only an officer and 30 men to protect the wounded. He was reprimanded by Bigot for this action. On 7 September he acted as a messenger between Vaudreuil and Amherst* in the negotiations for the surrender of Montreal. The town was defenceless and full of refugees who begged Vaudreuil to save their lives and belongings. Bougainville was taken prisoner along with the rest of the army and returned to France.



Bougainville's career in New France has been diversely judged. François de Lévis* had a low opinion of him and considered him a poor soldier. Some historians have held that he was partly responsible for New France being abandoned by France, and also for the defeat on the Plains of Abraham, because at that point it was he who was in charge of the defence of the shoreline beginning at Anse au Foulon. However, since Bougainville in this period had not assumed a post with great responsibility and was only carrying out orders, these judgements are too severe.

Not long after Bougainville's return to France an expedition against Brazil was being mounted, and there was some thought of entrusting command of the troops to him, but the signing of peace put an end to this project. Then he contemplated creating, with the help of Canadian refugees, a new colony that would make up for the loss of New France. The Duc de Choiseul, who had become minister of Marine, encouraged this endeavour. On 15 June 1763 Bougainville was appointed a naval captain and on 22 September he set out from Saint-Malo, France, with the *Aigle* and *Sphinx* to found a colony on the Îles Malouines (Falkland Islands), where he landed on 3 Feb. 1764 [see Antoine-Charles Denis* de Saint-Simon]. The court of Madrid naturally took umbrage at this incursion into what it considered its own preserve, and the islands had to be ceded back to Spain.

In the mean time Bougainville had conceived the project of a voyage of exploration and discovery around the world, which immediately received Choiseul's approval. On 5 Dec. 1766 he sailed from Brest on the frigate *Boudeuse* for an expedition that was to last 28 months and that would take him to Montevideo (Uruguay), to the Îles Malouines, which he ceremonially handed back to Spain, and then to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, where he was joined by the flute *Étoile*, under François Chenard de La Giraudais. After calling in again at Montevideo the two ships sailed through the Strait of Magellan, where they made contact with the so-called Patagonian giants, and then crossed the Pacific, making a stop at Tahiti that created a great literary and philosophical stir; over the following years, the Tahitian visit inspired a good many works claiming to demonstrate the superiority of "savage" over "civilized" society. After exploring the New Hebrides (Vanuatu), the Solomon Islands, New Ireland, and the north coast of New Guinea, Bougainville returned to France via the Molucca Islands, Batavia (Djakarta, Indonesia), Île de France (Mauritius), and the Cape of Good Hope. He landed at Saint-Malo on 16 March 1769, having carried out, with the loss of only seven lives, the first voyage around the world by

an officer of the French navy. The account of this voyage, published in 1771, met with great success and was immediately translated into English.

In March 1770 Bougainville was admitted permanently into the navy as a captain, and in December 1771 he was elected an associate member of the Académie de Marine; he then examined the possibility of making a scientific voyage to the polar regions, but this project came to nothing. In 1775 he served as second in command on the frigate *Terpsichore*, in 1776 on the *Solitaire*, and in 1777 as commander of the *Bien-Aimé* in a squadron on manœuvres. In April 1778 he received command of the *Guerrier* in the squadron that Vice-Admiral the Comte d'Estaing was to sail to American shores and then to the West Indies. Consequently he took part in the capture of Grenada on 6 July 1779 and in the unsuccessful attack on Savannah, Ga, in October 1779. Promoted rear-admiral on 8 December, he commanded the *Auguste* in the Comte de Grasses squadron in 1781–82 and distinguished himself in September 1781 in the battle of Chesapeake Bay, which led to the surrender of Yorktown, Va, and the independence of the United States. In January and February 1782 Bougainville took part in the fighting at St Christopher (Saint Kitts-Nevis) in the Leeward Islands, and in its capture, and he participated in the battle of the Saintes on 12 April. His conduct on the last occasion brought him a reprimand from a court martial held at Lorient, France, in 1784.

Bougainville, who had been received into the Académie de Marine as a regular member on 2 Dec. 1784 and had been admitted into the Order of Cincinnatus from the time of its foundation, became the minister's adviser on scientific questions and in this capacity assisted in preparations for the Comte de Lapérouse's voyage. In February 1789 he was made a member of the Académie des Sciences, and in October 1790 he received command of the Brest squadron, which he quickly relinquished because of the confusion and general disorganization associated with the French revolution. Promoted vice-admiral on 1 Jan. 1792, he resigned on 22 February and assisted the king at the time of the riot on 20 June. During the Terror he was arrested and imprisoned in Coutances; after the fall of Robespierre he was released, and on 19 Dec. 1795 he became a member of the new Institut de France.

Appointed successively member of the commission to prepare the expedition to Egypt in July 1798, senator in December 1799, member of the Bureau des Longitudes, associate in the organization of Nicolas

Baudin's expedition to Australia in 1799, count of the Empire in 1808, and president of the court martial held in connection with the battle of Trafalgar, Louis-Antoine de Bougainville was laden with honours at the end of an exceptionally full career which had enabled him to develop his many talents. A brilliant mathematician, clear-headed warrior, successful navigator, and skilful diplomat, Bougainville had a mind open to all the sciences and a clear, precise style of writing. He showed himself an excellent observer of the diversity of people he encountered during his various missions and can with reason be considered a founder of modern ethnography. Shaped by an advanced culture, he was one of those who, giving at times an appearance of superficiality, combined elegance with depth.

Étienne Taillemite

Louis-Antoine de Bougainville is the author of *Traité de calcul intégral, pour servir de suite à l' "Analyse des infiniments-petits" de M. le marquis de l'Hôpital* (2v., Paris, 1754-56) and of *Voyage autour du monde, par la frégate du roi la "Boudeuse," et la flûte l' "Étoile ; en 1766, 1767, 1768 & 1769* (Paris, 1771; réimpr., 1772, 1781; nouv. éd., Neuchâtel, Suisse, 1772; réimpr., 1773; nouv. éd., Lille, France, 1889; nouv. éd., introd. de P. Deslandres, Paris, 1924; nouv. éd., Étienne Taillemite, édit., Paris, 1977). The latter work was translated into English by J. R. Forster (Dublin, 1772) and into Spanish by Josefina Gallego de Dantin (Madrid, 1921). The manuscript "Journal de la *Boudeuse* (1766-1769)" can be found at AN, Marine, 4JJ, 142. His "Mémoire sur l'état de la Nouvelle-France à l'époque de la guerre de Sept Ans" has been published in *Relations et mémoires inédits pour servir à l'histoire de la France dans les pays d'outre-mer*, Pierre Margry, édit. (Paris, 1867), 37-84, as well as in ANQ *Rapport*, 1923-24: 1-70, as "La mission de M. de Bougainville en France en 1758-1759," an article which brings together the various reports presented by Bougainville at the time of his voyage. In 1964 Edward Pierce Hamilton translated and edited some writings by Bougainville in *Adventure in the wilderness: the American journals of Louis Antoine de Bougainville, 1756-1760* (Norman, Okla.). Étienne Taillemite has published all the navigation journals of Bougainville and his companions in *Bougainville et ses compagnons autour du monde* (2v., Paris, 1977). The journal that Bougainville kept while in Canada was published by Amédée-Edmond Gosselin in ANQ *Rapport*, 1923-24: 202-393.

AN, Col., C^{11A}, 104: ff.184, 188-92, 200-3, 267; 105: ff.17-18; C^{11E}, 10: ff.213-24; Marine, B⁴, 141-48; 152; 161-70; 192-93; 195; 205-6; 236;

C⁷ (dossier Bougainville). Guy Frégault, *François Bigot, administrateur français* (2v., [Montréal], 1948). René de Kérallain, *Bougainville à l'escadre du comte de Grasse* (Paris, 1929); *Bougainville à l'escadre du comte d'Estaing* (Paris, 1927); *Les Français au Canada, la jeunesse de Bougainville et la guerre de Sept Ans* (Paris, 1896); *La prise de Québec et la perte du Canada d'après des publications récentes* (Paris, 1906). J.-É. Martin-Allanic, *Bougainville navigateur et les découvertes de son temps* (2v., Paris, 1964). Michèle Duchet, "Bougainville, Raynal, Diderot et les Sauvages du Canada: une source ignorée de l'histoire des deux Indes," *Rev. d'hist. littéraire de France* (Paris), avril-juin 1963.



BOURLAMAQUE, FRANÇOIS-CHARLES DE, French army officer, governor of Guadeloupe; b. 1716, at Paris, France; d. “the night of 23–24 June 1764,” at Guadeloupe.

François-Charles de Bourlamaque is said to have been of Italian descent. His father, whose name is given as Jean-François de Bourlamaque, was an officer in the French service who was killed in the battle of Parma, 1734, while serving as a captain of grenadiers in the Régiment du Dauphin. Bourlamaque himself entered the same regiment as a volunteer in 1739, and became a second lieutenant in 1740, lieutenant in 1742, adjutant in May 1745, and captain in December 1745. Though he is often described as a military engineer, it seems evident that he never belonged to the corps of engineers; he may however have been employed at times on engineering duties. He is reported to have seen much service in the War of the Austrian Succession, including the battles of Fontenoy (1745) and Raucoux (Rocourt, Belgium) (1746). In 1755 he was given a pecuniary award for two years’ work devoted to improving the infantry drillbook.

In 1756 the court of Versailles reinforced New France and sent out new commanders for the troops there. The Marquis de Montcalm was promoted major-general (*maréchal de camp*) and dispatched to take command of the regular force; the Chevalier de Lévis* was made brigadier and second in command. Bourlamaque, who was still at this time captain and adjutant (*capitaine aide-major*) in the Régiment du Dauphin, was commissioned as colonel of infantry in Canada (11 March 1756) and thus became third in command. At the same time he received the cross of Saint-Louis. He sailed from Brest in the *Sirène* in April 1756, and reached Quebec on 15 May.

Shortly after his arrival he was actively involved in the preparations for the attack on the three British forts at Oswego. In June he was sent to take command at Fort Frontenac (Kingston, Ont.), where a force for this enterprise was being assembled. On 5 August Montcalm, with Bourlamaque and most of the troops, left Frontenac for Niaouré Bay (now Sackets Harbor, N.Y.) en route to Oswego. On the night of 10–11 August Bourlamaque took a detachment forward to cover the engineers who were to reconnoitre Fort Ontario (Oswego, N.Y.). He was placed in charge of the siege works, and trenches were opened on the evening of the 12th. The following day, Montcalm's journal records, Bourlamaque received "a contusion to the head," but did not leave the trenches. That night the British abandoned Fort Ontario and retired across the river to the other forts; and on 14 August their whole force surrendered.

Bourlamaque played a prominent part in the campaign of 1757 on the Lac Saint-Sacrement (Lake George) front. In the spring he was placed in command on this frontier. When the main French army invested Fort William Henry (also called Fort George; now Lake George, N.Y.) in the first week of August he was again charged by Montcalm with the direction of the siege. The place surrendered on the 9th, the capitulation being followed by an Indian massacre of prisoners. Montcalm was unable to follow up the victory, and the season ended with Bourlamaque standing on the defensive at the head of Lake Champlain with two regular battalions, working on the fort at Carillon (Ticonderoga, N.Y.)



The summer of 1758 witnessed the disastrous attempt of General James Abercromby* to invade Canada by the Lake Champlain route. Bourlamaque had charge of the French advanced troops in front of Carillon and retired into the defences as the British moved forward. On 8 July Abercromby attacked the trench line and *abattis* which the French had thrown up before the fort. His army suffered a bloody

repulse, successive charges being beaten back throughout the afternoon. Bourlamaque commanded the French left wing until about four o'clock, when he was "dangerously" wounded in the shoulder. The seriousness of the wound is indicated by the fact that he was able to leave Carillon to convalesce at Quebec only on 11 September.

In the crucial campaign of 1759 New France faced a double attack: by General Wolfe up the St Lawrence and by the new British commander-in-chief in America, General Jeffery Amherst*, following the line of Lac Saint-Sacrement and Lake Champlain. Montcalm, seconded by Lévis, opposed Wolfe at Quebec; it fell to Bourlamaque (who was promoted brigadier by a commission dated 10 February) to deal with Amherst. The latter had a force of over 11,000 men. Bourlamaque was given three of the eight French regular battalions in the country; colonial regular troops and militia brought the grand total of his command to some 4,000 men, of whom only roughly 3,000 were available for his main force. He had in addition a few Indians, whom he found to be of little use. He was in position at Carillon by the latter part of May, but Amherst did not advance until 21 July. To the surprise of the British, Bourlamaque did not attempt to defend the entrenched line in front of the fort on which they had been so badly defeated in 1758. To avoid the possibility of having his position turned and his whole force cut off, he withdrew from Fort Carillon on the night of 22–23 July. To delay the enemy he left a rearguard of 400 men under Captain d'Hébécourt (one of two officers of that name then serving in the Régiment de la Reine, and probably the senior, Louis-Philippe Le Dossu d'Hébécourt). Amherst brought up his artillery and began a siege of Carillon in form. D'Hébécourt made a spirited defence for four days; then on the evening of the 26th his force too slipped away by water and joined Bourlamaque, leaving a match burning in the magazine. The explosion did much damage to the fort. On 31 July Fort Saint-Frédéric (Crown Point, N.Y.) was likewise blown up, and Bourlamaque pulled his little army back to Île aux Noix in the Richelieu, where he proposed to make a final defence.

The Île aux Noix position had been considerably strengthened during the summer, and Bourlamaque continued to improve it, among other things taking steps to flood the mainland nearby. He was worried by the possibility of the British outflanking him by a movement through the forest. Amherst, however, made no such attempt. He proceeded to build a great new fort at Crown Point and a naval squadron on Lake Champlain. On 11 September a British party attempted unsuccessfully to burn a sloop that the French had constructed at Île aux Noix. Finally on

11 October the British flotilla moved down the lake. Three of Bourlamaque's four armed vessels, cut off from entering the Richelieu, were put out of action on the 12th, two being sunk by their crews and the third run ashore. But on the 18th Amherst heard of the fall of Quebec and at once abandoned the campaign.



Bourlamaque's operations in 1759 must be accounted a successful example of delaying action, though they might not have been so successful against an adversary less cautious than Amherst. Bourlamaque himself told Lévis that the British general's campaign had been "stupid." The brigadier's own most severe critic was Pierre de Rigaud*, Marquis de Vaudreuil, who complained that d'Hébécourt might well have defended Carillon for a fortnight longer. He got no change out of Bourlamaque, who replied that Vaudreuil himself had sent him an order on 20 May, reinforced by another on 1 June, to the effect that Carillon should be evacuated as soon as the enemy had set up batteries against it, and that it was more important to preserve the garrison than to gain time. Bourlamaque's instruction to d'Hébécourt, he told the governor, had been copied word for word from Vaudreuil's own orders. Lévis, who had succeeded the dead Montcalm, was well pleased; he reported to France that Bourlamaque had performed his task of defending the frontier "with the greatest distinction."

As the 1759 campaign drew to its close, Bourlamaque was complaining of ill health, including "a return of asthma." He told Lévis that this made it impossible for him to carry out Vaudreuil's desire that he remain on the frontier for the winter. In fact, he probably spent the greater part of the winter at Montreal; but in February he was in the Quebec area investigating the possibility of an enterprise against the

outposts of General James Murray *s garrison there. Finding this impracticable he returned to Montreal. For the 1760 campaign he did not go back to Lake Champlain. Lévis evidently wanted Bourlamaque with him for the stroke he was planning against Quebec, and it was Louis-Antoine de Bougainville* who was now sent to take command at Île aux Noix. Bourlamaque was thus second in command of the French army that attacked Quebec in April. He commanded the advanced guard during the approach to the city, and was wounded in the victory of Sainte-Foy, won over Murray on 28 April. In the early stages of the battle Lévis, fearing that his troops would not be able to form before Murray's attack came in, ordered a withdrawal of the left flank. While directing this Bourlamaque was hit in the right leg by a cannon-shot, his horse being killed under him. Subsequently Lieutenant-Colonel Jean d'Alquier, the officer now in command on the left, countermanded Lévis' order with excellent results for the French. Bourlamaque's injury was a flesh wound, and he recovered rapidly enough to play a part in the final stage of the year's campaign. In July he was sent to the Sorel area to prepare defences against a British advance up the St Lawrence from Quebec. On 10 August he was again dispatched there to oppose Murray's army. However, with the British in control of the water and his own militiamen deserting in large numbers, he was unable to offer any effective resistance and could only follow Murray's flotilla along the shore. On 2 September his attenuated detachment joined Lévis on the island of Montreal. Amherst had concentrated an overwhelming force against them – Murray from Quebec, William Haviland* by Lake Champlain, and Amherst's own army down the St Lawrence from Lake Ontario. There was no alternative, and Vaudreuil surrendered Montreal and Canada on 8–9 September.




Bourlamaque returned to France in accordance with the terms of the capitulation. His reputation had clearly been enhanced by the distinguished part he had played in the defence of the colony. He was promoted to the rank of commander in the order of Saint-Louis. In 1761 he led a military mission to Malta. On 1 Aug. 1762 he sent the Duc de Choiseul a striking “Mémoire sur le Canada” which argued that the country would be valuable to France if improvements were made in its administration. It would be well worth retaining, he said, even if the Great Lakes basin were lost; the colony had suffered through too much attention being paid to the fur trade and the establishment of distant posts, and not enough to developing the resources of the St Lawrence valley. Perhaps Bourlamaque hoped to be governor of Canada if the colony were returned to France at the peace. This, however, was not to be. In February 1763 Bourlamaque (who had been promoted major-general) was appointed governor of the then important colony of Guadeloupe, and later that year he took it over from the British who had been in occupation of it. In 1764 he died in office.


No evidence has been found that Bourlamaque ever married. He was on friendly terms with Montcalm, and the general's intimate letters to him (which he preserved in spite of Montcalm's repeated injunctions to destroy them) are an important source of information about both Montcalm himself and the events in which he took part. Bourlamaque's own surviving letters – chiefly addressed to his military superiors – are in general severely professional in tone. What we know of him leaves us with the impression of a gallant soldier – in this respect his wounds

seem to speak for him – and, rather less common in the French army of that era, a very competent officer. His memoir of 1762 suggests a keen and original mind. Beyond that there is little to be said. As a person, Bourlamaque largely eludes us.

C. P. Stacey

[Bourlamaque's letters to Lévis in 1759 and 1760 are in *Lettres de M. de Bourlamaque* (vol. V of the *Collection des manuscrits du maréchal de Lévis*, edited by H.-R. Casgrain). Montcalm's letters to Bourlamaque, published in the same volume, are not part of the Lévis manuscripts but are from the six-volume Bourlamaque collection, of which the originals, as in the case of the Lévis mss, are now in PAC. Generally speaking, the Bourlamaque collection consists of letters addressed to him rather than written by him, though there are a number of unsigned campaign narratives and other papers which are probably by Bourlamaque. The collection is calendared in PAC *Report, 1923*, app.C. Bourlamaque's "Mémoire sur le Canada" is published in *BRH*, XXV (1919), 257–76, 289–305, and repeated in XXVI (1920), 193–209, 225–40. Many documents among the various volumes of the Lévis manuscripts provide details concerning Bourlamaque's career in Canada. A personal file in AN, Col., E, 48 (dossier Bourlamaque) (mfm in PAC) relates chiefly to Bourlamaque's connection with Guadeloupe. Another in SHA, Y^d, 2393 (also in microfilm in PAC) affords some details concerning promotions, family, etc., but little concerning Bourlamaque's campaigns. Jeffery Amherst, *Journal* (Webster) and [William Amherst], *Journal of William Amherst in America, 1758–1760*, ed. J. C. Webster (Frome, London, 1927) are useful sources for campaigns in which Bourlamaque took part.






DIESKAU, JEAN-ARMAND (Johan Herman?), **Baron de DIESKAU**, army officer, governor of Brest, commander of the French regular troops in Canada; b. 1701, in Saxony; d. 1767, at Suresnes (dept. of Hauts-de-Seine), France.

Jean-Armand Dieskau, a Saxon in the French service, was the protégé of the Maréchal de Saxe, the finest general of French armies between Turenne and Napoleon. Dieskau was brought to France by his compatriot as an aide-de-camp in 1720 and served with him in various campaigns from 1733 to 1744. He became a colonel of cavalry, and apparently fought as such at Fontenoy (Belgium); in 1747 he was made major-general and military governor of Brest, the chief French naval base on the Atlantic.

On 1 March 1755 he was appointed commander of the battalions of French regulars being sent as reinforcements to Canada, and arrived in Quebec in June on the *Entreprenant*. His authority, while great, was scarcely absolute, for his instructions specifically made him subordinate to Governor General Pierre de Rigaud* de Vaudreuil. Baron Dieskau's role, therefore, was that of a battlefield commander with control of tactics but not of strategy.

By the summer of 1755, largely through the capture of Edward Braddock's papers at the battle of the Monongahela in July, the French knew of British plans for an attack on Fort Frontenac (Kingston, Ont.) and Fort Niagara (near Youngstown, N.Y.) as well as on Fort Saint-Frédéric (Crown Point, N.Y.) on Lake Champlain. Vaudreuil considered the former operation a greater danger and planned a countermove against Oswego to deprive the British of their base of operations on the Great Lakes. Dieskau was to direct it with a force of some 4,000 men.

While his force was assembling at Fort Frontenac, reports came in from Lake Champlain that the British expedition against Saint-Frédéric, commanded by Colonel William Johnson*, was already under way, threatening to ravage the country up to Montreal. Dieskau was called back by August 1755 and sent down the Richelieu against Johnson's colonial militia, now at the head of Lac Saint-Sacrement (Lake George). The French were encamped on the future site of Fort Carillon (Ticonderoga, N.Y.) by 1 September. Some of Dieskau's soldiers had been left at Fort Frontenac, so that his force was now smaller: 1,500 regulars, 1,000 militia, five to six hundred Indians. Johnson could muster some 3,000 colonial militia and 300 Indians, mostly Mohawks commanded by their chief Theyanoguin.



When word of the French arrival at the Ticonderoga site reached Johnson, he decided to build a fort at the head of Lake George, at the site of the future Fort William Henry (also called Fort George, now Lake George, N.Y.), 14 miles northwest of his first base, Fort Edward, on the Hudson River. Dieskau became aware of this division of enemy forces on 3 September through a prisoner. But he was led to believe that the British army had retired to Albany, leaving only 500 men at Fort Edward, and that Johnson's expected reinforcements – some 2,400 militia – would ignore this fort on their way to Lake George.

Dieskau saw in this news a marvellous opportunity to destroy the 500 colonials at Fort Edward and thus cut off the rest of Johnson's army at Lake George. This strategy would have been sound, if his intelligence had been accurate and he had moved with all his men. But he divided his forces and set off for Fort Edward with an élite corps of 1,500 men: some 200 regulars, 600 militia, and about 700 Indians including 300 Mohawks from Sault-Saint-Louis (Caughnawaga, Que.). He left behind at Ticonderoga 1,300 regulars and 400 militia as defence against any British attack. In dividing his strength, he not only disobeyed orders, but displayed a fatal overconfidence against mere colonials.

By 7 September his detachment had reached the Hudson River. At this point, however, the Indians refused to attack Fort Edward. Had Dieskau been more familiar with Indian warfare, he could have predicted their reluctance to assault fortified positions equipped with cannon. At the prospect of attacking with drastically reduced forces, Dieskau chose to divert his attack to the head of Lake George where the enemy were less solidly entrenched and had fewer cannon. The Indians agreed to support him.

On 8 September, he led his regulars along the wagon road to Lake George, with Indians and militia flanking them on the difficult terrain. On this march the French became aware that Johnson was sending 1,000 men to relieve Fort Edward, which he assumed was under attack. Dieskau laid plans for an ambush; he posted his disciplined regulars in formation on the road, his Indians and militia in advance on both forest flanks with instructions to hold their fire until the regulars fired. Into a similar trap Braddock had fallen. Success depended upon both militia and Indians keeping silent until the last moment. Whether by accident or because the Indians wished to warn their Mohawk cousins – Dieskau, of course, believed the latter – the trap was sprung prematurely. Both Colonel Ephraim Williams and Theyanoguin were killed, but their troops were able to retreat though in confusion.

Dieskau's pursuit of the terrified mob was hampered by the near exhaustion of his Indians and militia. Thus only his 200 regulars reached the British camp at Lake George on the heels of the defeated detachment. Johnson had fortified his position with anything available – carts, tree trunks, overturned boats – and had mounted cannon. Dieskau was confronted with the classic military problem of frontal assault on a prepared position. His regulars, with parade ground precision, marched to the assault; the militia, when they caught up, fired on the British from the flanks, as did some Indians. After several hours the battle ended in a stalemate. Dieskau himself was wounded three times in the legs and propped against a tree by his second in command, Pierre-André de Montreuil*. Even when the French finally retreated, Dieskau refused to be moved, allegedly stating he might as well die there as in bed. Later a British soldier (according to Dieskau a renegade Frenchman) shot him through the groin.

The British colonials claimed a major victory, not merely a tactical one. It was, in fact, a strategic stalemate: the British remained at what became Fort William Henry; the French constructed Fort Carillon. The British thrust of 1755 was stopped, and the French would capture William Henry before the final British victory.

Baron Dieskau survived his wounds. He was taken to New York, then to London, and then for treatment of his still unhealed wound in the groin to Bath, whence he dispatched letters to the French government, outlining his medical condition in graphic detail, emphasizing his lack of funds, and justifying his conduct, usually in that order. With peace in 1763, he was repatriated to France.

Contemporaries were, on the whole, condemnatory. Vaudreuil was vehement: Dieskau, by contravening orders not to divide his forces, had lost a chance to “massacre” the British. Montreuil, anxious to refute any accusation of abandoning his chief on the battlefield, was almost equally accusatory. André Doreil, the war commissary, noted that Dieskau was too rash for top command. But Dieskau had gambled, and lost. Aware that French regulars in Canada could not easily be replaced, he decided, understandably, to risk only 200 of them on a wilderness march. He showed adaptability to North American warfare in his attempt at ambush and also personal bravery at Lake George. With accurate intelligence, his actions might well have proved successful; at the least he stopped an invasion, and inflicted casualties as severe as those he received.

[Primary sources for a biography of Dieskau are fairly extensive: AN, Col., B, C^{11A} and F³, all contain material. His “dossier personnel” in AN, Col., E, 134, is also useful, as is material in the SHA. The “Lettres de Doreil,” APQ *Rapport, 1944-45*, contains an assessment of Dieskau, and the *Johnson papers* (Sullivan *et al.*) also includes material. The NYCD (O’Callaghan and Fernow), X, gives a full account in English of the French records, including the famous dialogue between Dieskau and the Maréchal de Saxe – an apologia for Dieskau’s conduct of the battle. Secondary sources that give more than cursory mention are reasonably numerous. Gipson, *British empire before the American revolution*, VI, throws light on British strategy and makes good use of the *Johnson papers*. Frégault, *Canada: the war of the conquest*, is indispensable for the French side. I. K. Steele, *Guerillas and grenadiers, the struggle for Canada, 1689-1760* (Frontenac Library, 3, Toronto, 1969), briefly but succinctly sums up the military situation, and Stanley, *New France*, provides a somewhat fuller treatment. j.r.t.]





PLANTAVIT DE LAPAUSE DE MARGON, JEAN-GUILLAUME, army officer and author; b. 14 Aug. 1721 in Pézenas, France, son of Henri Plantavit de Lapause de Margon and Grâce Maudon; d. unmarried 9 March 1804 in his home town.

Jean-Guillaume Plantavit de Lapause de Margon began his military career as an ensign in the Régiment de Guyenne on 16 May 1745. He attained the rank of lieutenant on 14 Aug. 1746, was appointed adjutant the following year, and then in 1751 was promoted captain. He arrived at Quebec on 23 June 1755 with the regular troops under the command of Jean-Armand Dieskau*.

In the summer of 1756 Lapause took part in the expedition led by Louis-Joseph de Montcalm* against the fortified base of Oswego (Chouaguen) (N.Y.). According to his own statement, he was carrying out the responsibilities of adjutant general and chief of staff, and his task was to help set up the siege of Oswego by reconnoitring the forts with François-Charles de Bourlamaque* and some engineers to determine the best tactics for the attack. He was also responsible for officering the Canadians who had come as reinforcements for the regular troops, fitting out the boats, and dispatching artillery and rations. On 14 August, after some bombardment and a short, three-day siege, the British surrendered. Following the victory Lapause was delegated to drawing up the terms and conditions of surrender and planning the evacuation. Some days later Montcalm wrote to François de Lévis*: "I cannot praise too highly my aides-de-camp, Lapause [and] Malartic [Anne-Joseph-Hippolyte de Maures* de Malartic]; I would have collapsed under the task without them, and Lapause is a sublime man who has greatly

eased my burden.” In addition Montcalm appointed him adjutant general, and he was also granted a pension of 300 *livres* from the royal treasury. Lapause’s duties were essentially of two kinds: on the one hand he was to attend to matters of practical organization of the army, taking all decisions about rations, supply, returns of men, arms, ammunition, and equipment of every sort; on the other hand he was to carry out reconnaissance missions.

In September 1756 Lapause went with the Régiment de Guyenne to Carillon (near Ticonderoga, N.Y.), where in accordance with his duties he closely examined the situation of the post and made several suggestions for improving its security, including having extensive clearing done around the fort to prevent a surprise attack by Indians. He spent the rest of 1756 in the Quebec region, where the troops took up winter quarters. The following May the Régiment de Guyenne was ordered to do work on Fort Chambly. In July it received instructions to leave for Carillon, where Montcalm was assembling troops for the siege of Fort George (also called Fort William Henry; now Lake George, N.Y.). Lapause inspected the troops and artillery, and also gave his views on the strategic situation, some of which were adopted by Montcalm and Lévis.

At the end of June 1759 Lapause was sent to Île aux Noix, on the Richelieu, to assist in fortifying it. Then on Montcalm’s orders he went to join Lévis, who was responsible for defending the frontiers of the Government of Montreal. In July Lapause took part in reconnaissance near Lake Champlain. After the fall of Fort Niagara (near Youngstown, N.Y.) in July, Governor Vaudreuil [Rigaud*] on 9 August sent him, with François-Marc-Antoine Le Mercier* and Lévis, to complete the construction of Fort Lévis (east of Prescott, Ont.), in order to meet the threat of a British invasion. In April 1760 Lapause was sent by Lévis on reconnaissance to the Rivière Jacques-Cartier, near Quebec. When Vaudreuil dispatched Lévis to recapture Quebec, Lapause was sent on ahead of the army to make preparations for its arrival and to reconnoitre the enemy’s positions. Lévis instructed him to draw the army up in battle order upon arrival and to assign each battalion to its

specific position, a heavy responsibility if ever there was one.



After the failure of the attempt to retake Quebec and the surrender of New France, Lapause sailed on the same ship as Lévis, reaching La Rochelle, France, on 27 Nov. 1760 and arriving in Paris on 5 December. That same year he received the cross of Saint-Louis. While in New France Lapause had written reports in which he gave his opinion on a variety of subjects, such as the causes of the food shortage in 1757. He thought Quebec's situation vulnerable and considered it desirable for France to continue to support the colony. Lapause had also kept a diary about his adventures in which he described his various missions and the course of operations during the Seven Years' War.

For Lapause there had never been any question of settling permanently in New France. He was first and foremost a career soldier. On 10 Feb. 1761 he was promoted colonel of infantry and received a gratuity of 3,000 *livres* for his services. Lévis had warmly recommended this promotion, and earlier Montcalm had asked for it with the utmost insistence. Both of them had spoken very highly of Lapause, as had André Doreil*, the financial commissary of wars in New France. Like many officers who though meritorious came from the gentry and had no fortune, he depended on the king's favour. Lévis said of him: "I think it for the good of the service to put him in the way of the most important posts and not leave him idle, since he is fit for any employment for which he may be wanted. He has the experience, abilities, and birth to merit a regiment, but not the means to buy one." In April 1761 Lapause was made an additional supernumerary colonel. In 1770 he became a

brigadier and received a pension of 1,000 *livres* from the order of Saint-Louis. He seems to have ended his career in an organizing capacity, since he was posted in 1780 to Saint-Omer, France, as assistant chief of army staff to engage in work on the canal.

Some years later Lapause would seem to have received the title of count and the rank of major-general; he then retired to his estates, dividing his time between his property at Beaune and his house at Pézenas, where he died on 9 March 1804.

Jeannine Pozzo-Laurent

The ANQ's *Rapport* has published the manuscripts of Jean-Guillaume Plantavit de Lapause de Margon in three parts: "Les 'mémoires' du chevalier de La Pause," 1932-33: 305-97; "*Mémoire et observations sur mon voyage au Canada*," 1931-32: 3-46; and "Les 'papiers' La Pause," 1933-34: 65-231.

Arch. municipales, Pézenas, France, État civil, Pézenas, 14 août 1721. AD, Hérault (Montpellier), État civil, Pézenas, 9 mars 1804. [L.-A.] de Bougainville, "Le journal de M. de Bougainville," A.[-E.] Gosselin, édit., ANQ *Rapport*, 1923-24. *Coll. des manuscrits de Lévis* (Casgrain), vols. 1-7, 10-12. [André] Doreil, "Lettres de Doreil," Antoine Roy, édit., ANQ *Rapport*, 1944-45. "Mémoire du Canada," ANQ *Rapport*, 1924-25. Thomas Chapais, *Le marquis de Montcalm (1712-1759)* (Québec, 1911).

FRENCH CANADIAN BUSH FIGHTERS





PÉCAUDY DE CONTRECŒUR, CLAUDE-PIERRE, officer in the colonial regular troops, seigneur, and member of the Legislative Council; b. 28 Dec. 1705 at Contrecoeur (Que.), son of Francois-Antoine Pécaudy* de Contrecoeur, a seigneur and officer in the colonial regulars, and Jeanne de Saint-Ours; d. 13 Dec. 1775 in Montreal (Que.).

Claude-Pierre Pécaudy de Contrecoeur's career is a good illustration of the vicissitudes in the life of a military officer who devoted himself almost entirely to the king's service. A cadet at 16, Contrecoeur at 20 was given the expectancy of an ensign's commission. In 1729 he was second ensign, then in 1734 a full ensign. In 1742, as a lieutenant, he commanded a detachment at Fort Saint-Frédéric (near Crown Point, N.Y.).



On 2 March 1746 Governor Beauharnois* promised to obtain recognition for his services. In 1748 he was promoted captain. At intervals he turned his attention as best he could to his family and his seigneurie of Saint-Denis. In 1749 Contrecoeur served as second in command in the expedition led by Pierre-Joseph Céloron* de Blainville down the Ohio valley; his older son, Claude-Francois, accompanied him. Immediately after, Contrecoeur was named commandant at Fort

Niagara (near Youngstown, N.Y.), which was strategically situated for maintaining liaison between the settlements on the St Lawrence and the vast and still sparsely occupied regions of the west and the Ohio valley, on the route to Louisiana. In the autumn of 1752 and the following winter Governor Duquesne wrote several letters to Contrecoeur to inform him, under the seal of secrecy, that in the spring an expedition of 2,000 men would be setting out “to establish our hold on the valley of the Belle-Rivière [Ohio River], which we are on the verge of losing.” During the summer and autumn of 1753 the expedition, commanded by Paul Marin* de La Malgue, opened the route as far as the Ohio watershed and built Fort de la Rivière au Bœuf (Waterford, Pa). Marin died at the end of October and was replaced by Jacques Legardeur* de Saint-Pierre, who immediately asked to be relieved of his duties. On 25 December Duquesne gave command of the force to Contrecoeur and on 27 Jan. 1754 ordered him to occupy the Ohio valley. A letter written by Contrecoeur’s nephew, Michel-Jean-Hugues Péan, reveals that, despite the privileges conceded by Duquesne and “all the other promises,” the new commander, whose wife was with him at Niagara, was not enthusiastic about an order which would force him to live separate from his family.

On 16 April 1754 Contrecoeur and a large force seized a fort the British were building where Pittsburgh, Pa, now stands. He called upon ensign Edward Ward and his 41 men to withdraw. After discussion, Ward agreed to leave on the 18th at noon, a decision which allowed Contrecoeur to dine with him on the evening of the 17th in order to obtain more information about British manoeuvres and also to negotiate the purchase of various carpenter’s tools. He went on with the construction of the fort, which took Governor Duquesne’s name, and held command of it until 1756. On the evening of 3 July 1754 at Fort Necessity (near Farmington, Pa) Louis Coulon* de Villiers forced George Washington to capitulate after a sharp combat that day. According to Duquesne’s testimony, these events, which finally secured the French position in the Ohio region, were to be attributed to the “wise and prudent conduct of the Sieur de Contrecoeur.”



But despite several requests Contrecoeur did not receive the reinforcements or the supplies and equipment necessary to ensure consolidation of recent gains. In the summer of 1755 Vaudreuil [Rigaud], who had succeeded Duquesne, complained to the minister of Marine, Machault, that Fort Duquesne was actually threatened by the British, who had 3,000 men six or eight leagues away, whereas Contrecoeur could count on only 1,600 “including militiamen and Indians.” Nevertheless, on 9 July 1755 the French troops, who were commanded initially by Daniel-Hyacinthe-Marie Liénard* de Beaujeu, won the important battle of the Monongahela, at a place three leagues from Fort Duquesne. In a letter on 20 July Contrecoeur indicated to the minister that an “unfortunate accident caused by the fatigues of the last campaign will perhaps make me unable to continue my services.” He asked the minister on 28 Nov. 1755 for the cross of the order of Saint-Louis, which he received in March 1756, and for promotions for his two sons, one an ensign, the other a cadet. His military career was essentially finished, but he did not officially obtain his retirement and pension with half pay until 1 Jan. 1759.

After the conquest Contrecoeur chose to remain in Canada and was finally able to attend to his affairs and his seigneurie, which in 1765 counted 371 persons, 6,640 acres under cultivation, and 973 animals. Writing to Lord Hillsborough on 15 March 1769, Governor Guy Carleton* called him the third most influential Canadian. On 3 Jan. 1775 Contrecoeur was appointed to the Legislative Council, and he was sworn in on 17 August. His career there was short, since he died in Montreal on 13 December, having attended only one meeting.

On 10 Jan. 1729, at Boucherville, Claude-Pierre Pécaudy de Contrecoeur had married Marie-Madeleine, daughter of René Boucher* de La Perrière, and they had nine children. On 9 Sept. 1768 in Quebec, he had taken as his second wife Marguerite-Barbe Hingue de Puygibault, the widow of Étienne Roberet de La Morandière.


Fernand Grenier

[The principal manuscript sources concerning Claude-Pierre Pécaudy de Contrecoeur are the Contrecoeur papers held at ASQ in the Fonds Viger-Verreau, cartons I to IV. This collection also contains various other papers, in particular those of Jacques Legardeur de Saint-Pierre and Paul Marin de La Malgue. A number of the Viger-Verreau documents have been published in *Papiers Contrecoeur* (Grenier); its bibliography contains a description of relevant manuscript and printed sources, secondary works, and articles. Useful also are F.-J. Audet. *Contrecoeur, famille, seigneurie, paroisse, village* (Montréal, 1940), and Hunter, *Forts on Pa. frontier*. f.g.]



LIÉNARD DE BEAUJEU, DANIEL-HYACINTHE-MARIE, officer in the colonial regular troops, seigneur, entrepreneur; b. 9 Aug. 1711 at Montreal, son of Louis Liénard de Beaujeu and Thérèse-Denise Migeon de Branssat; killed in action near Fort Duquesne (Pittsburgh, Pa.), 9 July 1755.

Daniel-Hyacinthe-Marie Liénard de Beaujeu grew up in Montreal and, like his father, joined the armed forces as an officer candidate while still in his teens. He may have spent some of his boyhood in the west, his father having been at posts such as Michilimackinac. The locations of his early service and the dates of his promotions are not recorded. At age 25, in Quebec, he married Michelle-Élisabeth, the daughter of François Foucault (4 March 1737). Of their nine children only two daughters survived into adulthood.



In June 1746 Lieutenant Beaujeu was among the leaders of a 700-man Canadian army dispatched to Nova Scotia to link up with forces expected from France for the capture of Louisbourg and Annapolis Royal [see La Roche-Foucauld]. His 28,000-word journal of the 10-month campaign includes a detailed account of their greatest exploit. After a 150-mile march in bitter mid-winter, 300 Canadians and Indians attacked 500 New Englanders billeted in Grand Pré and forced their surrender after bloody fighting (11 Feb. 1747) [see Arthur Noble]. In several separate columns, they made a stealthy approach in the middle of the night. “A sentry who spotted us cried Who goes there? . . . We saw the watchkeeper come at once to the door. But the night was so dark, and we were hugging the ground so carefully, making no noise, that although we were within thirty paces, he considered it a false alarm and went back inside again. . . . In less than ten minutes we took the

guardhouse. . . . All around we could hear musket fire. In every direction we could see men moving without being able to distinguish if they were our people or the enemy. . . . We had almost all lost our snowshoes and the amount of snow prevented us from moving smartly. . . . We would have been more gratified with our achievements if we had been able to learn that the other detachments had had as good success.”

With 20 years’ service, and recently promoted captain, Beaujeu was named commanding officer at Fort Niagara (near Youngstown, N.Y.) in 1749. He arrived there to take charge on 5 July. Niagara was the most strategic post in the *pays d’en haut* and Beaujeu apparently filled his role efficiently; still, he did not relish it. He knew sites farther west would yield more profit from furs. In December he reminded La Jonquière [Taffanel] that his predecessor as governor, La Galissonnière [Barrin], had pledged, “in detaching me for Niagara, to station me the next spring in an advantageous post. . . .” He was full of complaints: his fort was crumbling into Lake Ontario, the garrison consisted of “veteran drunkards from Montreal,” he lacked skilled workers and vital materials for simple maintenance. Reaching a shrill pitch of eloquence, he likened his post to a “cattle pen.” Nevertheless, he was commandant of Niagara for the next several years.



In addition to directing military affairs he enforced trade regulations and tried to improve the portage road, but relations with Indians were his major concern. He had to try to preserve peace in the Great Lakes basin, on one occasion restraining some 40 Senecas who had decided to go on the warpath. Oswego was the most consistently troublesome problem. Beaujeu could not stop Indians who came down the Niagara portage from going on to trade their choicest furs at that

New York outpost. To sustain French commerce, either Oswego had to be destroyed, he advised, or French prices for brandy and textiles had to come down to English levels.

Beaujeu's last big assignment, in 1755, was to replace Claude-Pierre Pécaudy* de Contrecoeur as commanding officer of newly built Fort Duquesne. His group left Lachine for the disputed Ohio country at the opening of navigation, 20 April, and arrived at Fort Frontenac (Kingston, Ont.) at the month's end. Embarking in two sailing vessels, they reached Niagara in the second week of May.

The 500-mile supply line from Montreal to Fort Duquesne was complicated and still experimental. For his passage along the route, Beaujeu came armed with authority – in association with Pierre Landriève – to decide all arrangements necessary for supporting Canada's southward expansion. Everyone seemed to be waiting for him, requesting orders, approval, solutions. Correspondence among the western posts mentioned, as a matter of high moment, that Beaujeu had just left or was expected. At Niagara he decreed where extraordinary reinforcements he might be needing were to come from, looked to his men's health, bullied tons of supplies up the steep hill around the falls, dispatched 13 boats to row to Fort de la Presqu'île (now Erie, Pa.) and a gang of men to drive horses there through the woods, and still found composure enough to get down on paper proposals for making portage operations more efficient and for improving French bateaux. On 1 June he himself embarked on Lake Erie with 16 more boats. From Presqu'île Beaujeu sent orders back to Niagara to hasten 14 dozen muskets, and ahead to Ohio to muster all available craft up towards the headwaters. On 17 June, from Fort de la Rivière au Bœuf (Waterford, Pa.), he sent ahead wheat, bullets, and gunpowder. At Venango (Franklin, Pa.) he pressed into the reluctant hands of Michel Maray* de La Chauvignerie a commission to build a regular fort there whether materials were available or not, along with a plan of what it should look like.



En route, Beaujeu was receiving urgent messages from the man he was coming to replace. Bring your men quickly, Contrecoeur wrote in mid-May, let Philippe-Thomas Chabert de Joncaire expedite the supplies. Three weeks later ominous details were learned from an enemy deserter: 3,000 English and American soldiers, under Edward Braddock, were pushing towards Duquesne with over a dozen 18-pounder cannon.

His progress to the fort was the peak of Beaujeu's career. Forty-four years old, active and incisive, he now assumed a leading role at the centre of continent-shaping affairs. Promotions had come rapidly. The Ohio valley was just such a fur-rich land as he had long yearned to win. He had business interests on the Labrador coast, had recently assembled three linked fiefs, and was angling for a fourth, which would make him seigneur of a 250-square-mile estate in the Richelieu valley (Lacolle).

At the end of June he arrived at the forks of the Ohio. Contrecoeur remained commandant until the crisis cooled. The tempo of preparations increased as Fort Duquesne's leaders weighed information about the enemy's approach, wooed tribes whose manpower was needed to strengthen the French, and hammered out a strategy to keep the Ohio a link between Canada and Louisiana. They decided to fight the first battle well beyond the walls. At 8.00 a.m. on 9 July, Beaujeu led off a squad to ambush the British advance force of 1,500. He had 637 Indians, 146 Canadian militia, and 108 officers and men from the colonial regulars. As at Grand Pré, they would attack the enemy with inferior numbers. The French would have had to reconsider risking this initiative had not Beaujeu harangued the Indians – local Ottawas and

Delawares, along with Hurons and Abenakis from the St Lawrence valley – into forgetting their fears of British numbers and cannon: “I am determined to go ahead and meet the enemy. What! Will you let your father go by himself? I am sure to beat them.”

About 1.00 p.m., before the ambush was prepared, Beaujeu’s party unexpectedly met the British in the woods. Contrecoeur reported: “The enemy’s artillery caused our people to fall back twice, M. De Beaujeu was killed by the third discharge . . . just as our French and Indians were beginning to hold their own. This accident instead of discouraging our men only reanimated them. . . .” Rallied by Jean-Daniel Dumas*, the French and Indians put the English and Americans to rout – a victory that made the Ohio safe for French interests for another few years.

Beaujeu’s body was carried back to Fort Duquesne and buried there 12 July. His career had been one of ever greater success; he never knew defeat, old age, or failure. The geographical dispersion of his major battles – the Bay of Fundy and the Ohio valley – reveals him as an agent of an ambitious French empire in New France. But in the mid-1750s that empire was about to disappear.

Malcolm MacLeod

ANQ, Greffe de R.-C. Barolet, 3 mars 1737; NF, Ins. Cons. sup., IX, 82–83; X, 6. Archives du Collège Bourget (Rigaud, Qué.), Famille Beaujeu, papiers de famille et notes par le Pere Alphonse Gauthier. PAC, MG 8, F50. *Coll. doc. inédits Canada et Amérique, II. Inv. de pièces du Labrador* (P.-G. Roy). “Lettres de Daniel-Hyacinthe Liénard de Beaujeu, commandant au fort Niagara,” *BRH*, XXXVII (1931), 355–72. *NYCD* (O’Callaghan and Fernow), XI, 303–4. *Papiers Contrecoeur* (Grenier). Le Jeune, *Dictionnaire*. P.-G. Roy, *Inv. concessions*, IV, 263–67. Monongahéla de Beaujeu, *Le héros de la Monongahéla; esquisse historique* (Montréal, 1892), 3–4, 10–21. François Daniel, *Histoire des grandes familles françaises du Canada . . .* (Montréal, 1867), 255, 261–62. P.-G. Roy, *Les petites choses de notre histoire* (7 sér., Lévis, Québec, 1919–44), 3^e sér., 239–42. Stanley, *New France*. C.-F. Bouthillier, “La bataille du 9 juillet 1755,” *BRH*, XIV (1908), 222–23.



MOUET DE LANGLADE, CHARLES-MICHEL, fur-trader, officer in the colonial regular troops, and Indian department employee; baptized 9 May 1729 at Michilimackinac (Mackinaw City, Mich.), son of Augustin Mouet de Langlade, a prominent trader, and Domitilde, sister of Nissowaquet; m. 12 Aug. 1754 at Michilimackinac Charlotte-Ambroisine, daughter of René Bourassa, *dit* La Ronde, and they had two daughters; he also had a son Charles by an earlier liaison with an Ottawa woman; d. during the winter of 1800–1 at La Baye (Green Bay, Wis.).

Throughout his long active career Charles-Michel Mouet de Langlade was known for his influence with the Indians. His authority derived from his relationship to Nissowaquet, an important chief, from his personal qualities, and from an incident during his childhood. As a ten-year-old boy he had accompanied Nissowaquet on a successful attack against the Chickasaws. The Ottawas, who had twice previously been defeated, decided that a special protecting spirit must dwell with him.



By 1750 Langlade was a cadet in the colonial regulars. His first recorded military exploit occurred in 1752 at Pickawillany (Piqua, Ohio). The British and the French were in bitter competition for control of the Ohio valley and its native population. When Pierre-Joseph Céloron* de Blainville was unable to persuade the Miamis under Memeskia (La Demoiselle) to move from Pickawillany, which was within the British sphere of influence, Langlade was sent there with a force of perhaps 300 Indians and French. Attacking on 21 June when most of the Miamis

were away hunting, Langlade forced the remaining few and the British traders present to surrender. Memeskia was boiled and eaten. Governor Duquesne wrote of Langlade: "He is acknowledged here to be very brave, to have much influence on the minds of the Indians, and to be very zealous when ordered to do anything."

Promoted ensign on 15 March 1755, Langlade was active in the Seven Years' War. He claimed to have planned the ambush that led to Jean-Daniel Dumas's defeat of Edward Braddock near Fort Duquesne (Pittsburgh, Pa) in 1755. In August 1756 he and his Indian followers returned to Fort Duquesne as scouts. They remained in the east during the winter and on 21 Jan. 1757 were part of a force which successfully ambushed Robert Rogers and his rangers near Fort Carillon (Ticonderoga, N.Y.). Langlade was by this time an ensign on half pay. While serving under Montcalm* during the siege of Fort William Henry (also known as Fort George, now Lake George, N.Y.) that summer, he was instrumental in capturing a British flotilla. In September 1757 Governor Vaudreuil [Rigaud] made him second in command at Michilimackinac. Langlade was present at the siege of Quebec two years later. If the reinforcements he had requested of Lévis had arrived in time, he and his Indians might have destroyed the detachment Wolfe* took to reconnoitre up the Montmorency River on 26 July. Instead, both sides withdrew after a brief skirmish. In 1760 Langlade came from Michilimackinac to Montreal, where he learned he had been promoted lieutenant on half pay. Ordered to leave the city just before its surrender, he returned to Michilimackinac where he held command until the British arrived in September 1761.



Langlade's time had not, however, been exclusively taken up by military service. In October 1755 he had been ordered by the

commandant at Michilimackinac to establish a trading post at the mouth of the Grand River (Grand Haven, Mich.) and to use it to help maintain control of the Ottawas and Potawatomis along the western shore of Lake Michigan. Langlade continued to do his winter trading at this site through 1790, having as many as 15 men working for him.

Like many residents of Michilimackinac, Langlade appears to have adjusted to British rule with little difficulty. When in 1763 he heard rumours of an Ojibwa uprising he warned the commandant, George Etherington. Etherington did not listen, however, and the Ojibwas under Madjeckewiss* seized the fort. Langlade, at great risk to his life, rescued Etherington and William Leslye from the stake where they were to be sacrificed. He has been criticized for refusing refuge in his home to Alexander Henry* the elder. Langlade was unwilling to hazard the safety of his family but he did see to it that Henry was saved, and with his help and that of his Ottawa relatives the survivors of the attack were eventually taken to Montreal. Langlade took command of the fort until the British presence was reasserted the next year. He then moved his permanent home to La Baye, where his father was already living.

Early in the American revolution Governor Guy Carleton* referred to Langlade, by then a captain in the Indian department, as “a man I have had every reason to be very much satisfied with and who from his influence among the Indians of that district may be very much use.” After bringing Indians to help defend Montreal in 1776 Langlade, with Luc de La Corne, joined Burgoyne in the summer of 1777. Although many of Burgoyne’s Indians left, Langlade and his Ottawa followers stayed until the attack on Bennington (Vt). When Langlade returned to the west from Montreal in the fall of 1778 he was called upon to gather an Indian force to assist Henry Hamilton against rebel sympathizers at Vincennes (Ind.). Unsuccessful in the fall because the Indians had gone to their winter hunting grounds, Langlade collected a force in the spring. The Indians refused to move, however, when they heard that Hamilton had been captured by George Rogers Clark. Clark sent an agent, Daniel-Maurice Godefroy de Linctot, to destroy Langlade’s influence with the Indians but Langlade and his nephew, Charles Gautier de Verville, used generous gifts to maintain their support. In 1780 Langlade took an Indian force into the Illinois country to assist in the attack on Spanish St Louis (Mo.) but was chased back to Lake Michigan by Linctot’s horsemen [see Wahpasha*].

After the war Langlade continued to serve in the Indian department. He received goods that Gautier had embezzled from the

British storehouse on Mackinac Island, but although Gautier was discovered and dismissed from his post as storekeeper and interpreter in 1793 Langlade retained his position. He remained active until his death and enjoyed telling about 99 battles in which he had participated. A companion, recalling Langlade's actions, said he "never saw so perfectly cool and fearless a man on the field of battle."

Paul Trap

AN, Col., C^{11A}, 98, p.27 (transcript at PAC). Newberry Library (Chicago), Edward E. Ayer coll., mss 490, 810. PAC, MG 25, 186; RG 10, A2, 1824, pp.107-14, 487-93; 1828, pp.8021-24. Wis., State Hist. Soc. (Madison), Benjamin Sulte, "Origines de Langlade."

Bougainville, *Adventure in wilderness* (Hamilton), 81-82. John Burgoyne, *A state of the expedition from Canada . . .* (London, 1780; repr. New York, 1969), app.viii, xxxvi-xxxix. [A. S. De Peyster], *Miscellanies, by an officer*, ed. J. W. De Peyster ([2nd ed.], 2v. in 1, New York, 1888), 4-15. Henry, *Travels and adventures. John Askin papers* (Quaife), I, 136-37, 352-53. [James Johnstone, known as Chevalier de Johnstone], "A dialogue in Hades," Literary and Hist. Soc. of Quebec, *Manuscripts relating to the early history of Canada* (Quebec, 1868; repr. 1927), 12-18. John Long, *Voyages and travels of an Indian interpreter and trader . . .* (London, 1791; repr. New York, 1968, and Toronto, 1971), 148, 151. *Michigan Pioneer Coll.*, VIII (1885), 367-68, 466-67; IX (1886), 361-63, 371-73, 377-78, 380-81, 383-86, 392, 545-46, 558-60; X (1886), 270-71, 275-78, 372-73; XI (1887), 419; XII (1887), 42; XV (1889), 112-13; XIX (1891), 366, 411, 425-26, 448-49, 455-56; XX (1892), 668-69; XXVII (1896), 631-32, 665-70. *NYCD* (O'Callaghan and Fernow), X, 245-51, 303-4, 591-621. *Wis.*, State Hist. Soc., *Coll.*, I (1855), 39; III (1857), 195-295; VIII (1879), 209-23, 227-30; XI (1888), 97-125; XII (1892), 39-41, 44-46, 97-99; XVIII (1908), 128-31, 135-40, 149, 163, 209-11, 253-58, 278-79, 355-56, 371-74, 391, 403-4, 406-8, 415, 417-19, 443-46, 462-68, 475, 481-82, 484, 486, 493-95; XIX (1910), 3, 5, 9, 29, 37, 44, 48, 51, 54-56, 62-63, 80, 82, 88-89, 299-300.

